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98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020)

SENTENCED TO SURVEILLANCE:
FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON ELECTRONIC
MONITORING*
KATE WEISBURD**
As courts and legislatures increasingly recognize that “digital is different” and
attempt to limit government surveillance of private data, one group is
conspicuously excluded from this new privacy-protective discourse: the five
million people in the United States on probation, parole, or other forms of
community supervision. This Article is the first to explore how warrantless
electronic surveillance is dramatically transforming community supervision and,
as a result, amplifying a growing privacy-protection disparity: those in the
criminal legal system are increasingly losing privacy protections even while those
not in the system are increasingly gaining privacy protections. The quickly
expanding use of GPS-equipped ankle monitors, as well as other forms of
electronic searches, reflects unprecedented government surveillance that has yet to
be regulated, scrutinized, or limited in any meaningful way.
This Article explores this phenomenon in its own right but also contends that the
expanding disparity in privacy protections is explained by two underappreciated
but significant shifts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, on the theory
that defendants “choose” surveillance in exchange for avoiding incarceration,
courts increasingly invoke consent to justify otherwise unconstitutional
surveillance of people on community supervision. While the debate over criminal
justice bargaining is not new, the expanded reliance on consent in this context
reveals blind spots in the existing debate. Second, courts also increasingly accept
government arguments in favor of otherwise unconstitutional electronic
monitoring under a general “reasonableness” standard, as opposed to the
traditional “special needs” doctrine. This insidious shift toward “reasonableness”
threatens to jeopardize the precise interests the Fourth Amendment was designed
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to protect. But even under a reasonableness standard, electronic surveillance of
people on community supervision should be more circumscribed. Ultimately, this
Article reveals how the significance of these two shifts extends beyond electronic
surveillance and represents a new frontier of sanctioning warrantless searches
without any level of suspicion or exception to the warrant requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
The key government witness against Zackary Jackson was not a person but
the GPS-equipped monitor strapped to his ankle.1 It was the GPS monitor, and
the GPS monitor alone, that placed Mr. Jackson at the scene of a robbery in
Washington, D.C., in 2015. And it was the GPS monitor that led the police to
Mr. Jackson’s location where he was arrested. Mr. Jackson’s arrest for robbery,
and his ultimate conviction, was the culmination of a coordinated effort between
the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. Court Services and
Offender Supervision Agency. At the time of the 2015 robbery Mr. Jackson was
on probation for a prior offense. A few weeks prior to the robbery, his probation
officer was contacted by a D.C. police detective asking that Mr. Jackson be
placed on a GPS monitor so that the police could track him and see if he
committed any crimes.2 Mr. Jackson’s probation officer then reviewed his file,
concluded that he was in violation of some technical rules, including his failure
to find employment and participate in programming, and required that Mr.
Jackson wear a GPS ankle monitor.3 As a condition of wearing the monitor, Mr.
Jackson signed a contract agreeing to twenty-two GPS-specific rules, including
that he obtain pre-approval to change his daily schedule, that he charge his
device twice a day, that he not fall asleep while the device charges, and other
rules.4 There was no term about Mr. Jackson’s location data being shared with
the police. Although the trial court found that the government’s use of the GPS
data infringed on Mr. Jackson’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the D.C.
Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the “Fourth Amendment permits
probation supervision to intrude significantly on probationers’ privacy.”5
Mr. Jackson’s case is no anomaly; in the past few years, surveillance
technology has dramatically transformed community supervision.6 The use of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 469–70 (D.C. 2019).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 475.
See Ava Kofman, Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring Drives Defendants into Debt, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/magazine/digital-jailsurveillance.html [https://perma.cc/9A4G-XF5W (dark archive)]. Throughout this Article, the author
uses the term “community supervision” to describe the different types of state and federal probation,
parole, and supervised release.
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electronic monitoring has more than doubled in the past decade,7 with people
now routinely placed on ankle monitors that they must pay for, that track their
every move 24–7, and that are accompanied by dozens of rules that govern all
aspects of daily life.8 Those who have been on a monitor describe it as a “digital
shackle,”9 a “satellite prison,”10 and that it made them “feel like an animal.”11
Likewise, many people on community supervision—both adults and children—
are subject to continuous suspicionless searches of their personal electronic
devices and data.12 To an unprecedented degree, the state now has the power
to monitor the political speech, religious affiliations, health information, and
romantic or personal communications of thousands of young people and adults
on community supervision.13
Curiously, this level of increasingly invasive and largely unregulated
electronic surveillance of those on community supervision stands in stark
contrast to recent statutory efforts and constitutional court decisions
significantly limiting government surveillance of private citizens who are not in
the criminal legal system. Critics on both ends of the political spectrum oppose
large-scale government collection of DNA14 and have lamented the extent to
which law enforcement agencies analyze social media data.15 At the same time,
7. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., USE OF ELECTRONIC OFFENDER-TRACKING DEVICES
EXPANDS SHARPLY 1 (Sept. 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/10/
use_of_electronic_offender_tracking_devices_expands_sharply.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3Q-QZ54].
8. Kate Weisburd, Monitoring Youth: The Collision of Rights and Rehabilitation, 101 IOWA L. REV.
297, 304 (2015) (describing typical electronic monitoring requirements for a sixteen-year-old, including
having any outings other than those school approved at least forty-eight hours in advance).
9. Olivia Solon, ‘Digital Shackles’: The Unexcepted Cruelty of Ankle Monitors, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/28/digital-shackles-the-unexpectedcruelty-of-ankle-monitors [https://perma.cc/LPK5-MQ3X].
10. James Kilgore, Monica Cosby-“Out Here We Have So Much More To Lose”, YOUTUBE (Mar.
24, 2018), www.youtube.com/watch?v=gON7U5Szdmc [https://perma.cc/V8KD-MUE4].
11. Myaisha Hayes, Opinion, #NoMoreShackles: Why Electronic Monitoring Devices Are Another
Form of Prison, COLORLINES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/
nomoreshackles-why-electronic-monitoring-devices-are-another-form-prison-op-ed [https://perma.cc/
H4RT-3CQP].
12. See, e.g., United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding a condition
of supervised release permitting search of defendant’s personal computers); United States v. Ristine,
335 F.3d 692, 695–97 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749–50 (Cal. 2019)
(striking down an electronic search condition for a young person on probation); State v. Phillips, 266
So. 3d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing suppression order regarding evidence obtained
during a warrantless cellphone search of parolee).
13. See infra Section I.A.1.
14. See,
e.g.,
Federal
DNA
Collection,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/foia/federal-dna-collection [https://perma.cc/CJ8W-238P]; P.J. Klosinski, Bill of
Rights Privacy vs. Legislated DNA Collection, LIBERTARIAN PARTY IND. (Dec. 21, 2016),
http://lpin.org/bill-of-rights-privacy-vs-legislated-dna-collection/
[https://perma.cc/5QAX-29FR]
(arguing against arrestee DNA database expansion).
15. See,
e.g.,
Free
Speech
and
Toleration,
CHARLES
KOCH
INST.,
https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/free-speech-and-toleration [https://perma.cc/4VZFCV3U]; Hugh Handeyside, We’re Demanding the Government Come Clean on Surveillance of Social Media,
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reports of private companies collecting and selling cell phone location data,16 as
well as private photos on social media websites,17 have set off bipartisan alarms
and a call for greater regulation.18 Likewise, efforts are underway at the local,
state, and federal levels to regulate—and sometimes ban—the use of facial
recognition technology.19 And the oft-divided Supreme Court has taken
unanimous stands against warrantless electronic surveillance and cell phone
searches of arrestees, even when officers have probable cause to arrest the
suspect.20 The Court has likewise recognized that the concept of a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” for Fourth Amendment purposes must reflect the
“seismic shifts in digital technology”21 that now allow for “near perfect
surveillance”22 of digital records that “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies
of life.’”23 These efforts reflect a bipartisan consensus that, when it comes to
government surveillance of private citizens, “digital is different.”24
ACLU (May 24, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/weredemanding-government-come-clean-surveillance-social [https://perma.cc/6WTZ-SZWE].
16. Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, How To Track Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/opinion/location-data-national-security.html
[https://perma.cc/H7SQ-JPDM (dark archive)] (citing Democratic and Republican Senators’ concerns
that passive location tracking via smartphones violates privacy rights).
17. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facialrecognition.html [https://perma.cc/93J6-HWQ8 (dark archive)].
18. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, New Jersey Bars Police from Using Clearview Facial Recognition App, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/technology/clearview-ai-newjersey.html [https://perma.cc/79E8-DN2X (dark archive)].
19. See, e.g., S. 1385, 191st Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mass. 2019) (calling for a moratorium on facial
recognition and other biometric surveillance systems); S. 5528, 66th Leg., 2019 Leg. Sess. (Wash.
2019) (restricting use of facial recognition technology by government entities); Facial Recognition
Technology (Part 1): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight &
Reform, 116th Cong. 1–3 (2019) [hereinafter Hearing], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/
GO00/20190522/109521/HHRG-116-GO00-Transcript-20190522.pdf
[https://perma.cc/679KMGMA] (statement of Hon. Elijah Cummings, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform); Kate
Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-sanfrancisco.html [https://perma.cc/J5TW-XKPT (dark archive)].
20. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that third-party
possession of an individual’s cellphone location data “does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to
Fourth Amendment protection”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (requiring, generally, a
warrant for cellphone searches of arrestees); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding
that long-term GPS tracking of a suspect’s vehicle constituted a search).
21. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
22. Id. at 2210.
23. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
24. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 19, at 9–11 (statement of Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Professor of
Law, University of D.C.) (explaining that new regulation of surveillance technology is needed because
“digital is different”); Jennifer Stisa Granick, SCOTUS & Cell Phone Searches: Digital Is Different, JUST
SECURITY (June 25, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12219/scotus-cell-phone-searches-digital
[https://perma.cc/E3VQ-RXZX] (arguing that Riley stands for a Fourth Amendment principle of
greater protection for electronic information).
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And yet, for the 4.5 million people in the United States on probation,
parole, and other forms of community-based court supervision,25 “digital is
different” has come to mean digital is worse.26 Perversely, the surge in electronic
surveillance mechanisms has amplified a growing privacy-protection disparity:
those not in the criminal legal system are increasingly gaining privacy
protections while those inside of the system, like Mr. Jackson, are increasingly
losing privacy protections. There is a general and growing consensus that
“[w]ithin America’s own representative democracy, citizens would surely rise
up in outrage if the government attempted to mandate that every person above
the age of 12 carry a tracking device that revealed their location 24 hours a
day.”27 Yet this is the lived experience of those on probation and parole who
wear GPS ankle monitors, and the disparity in privacy protections does not
impact everyone equally.28 As other scholars have observed, surveillance and
other forms of automated big data policing reflect both a history of racialized
social control and inequity.29
Of course, the unequal distribution of privacy rights between those in the
criminal legal system and those not is hardly a new phenomenon.30 People on
25. See Jake Horowitz, Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities,
PEW (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/09/
probation-and-parole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities [https://perma.cc/3VMKX5TJ]; cf. New Analysis Shows How Parole and Probation Violations Significantly Impact States’ Prison
Populations and Budgets, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (June 18, 2019), https://csgjusticecenter.org/
corrections/posts/new-analysis-shows-how-parole-and-probation-violations-significantly-impactstates-prison-populations-and-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/F6YP-D8A5] (stating that approximately
95,000 people are incarcerated due to technical probation or parole violations every day, at an annual
cost of approximately $2.8 billion); Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million
Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/R4EG-D69V (dark archive)]
(detailing the specific location information of millions of Americans that private corporations collect
and hold).
26. See infra Section III.C.2.c.
27. Thompson & Warzel, supra note 25.
28. See Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1288 (2017)
(describing the racialized nature of “unequal private privacy”).
29. See SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 8 (2015)
(“[E]nactments of surveillance reify boundaries along racial lines . . . the outcome of this is often
discriminatory and violent treatment.”); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA
POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 131–40 (2017); Ruha
Benjamin, Introduction, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL TECHNOSCIENCE, AND
LIBERATORY IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 3, 3 (Ruha Benjamin ed., 2019) (describing
automated policing as the “New Jim Code—innovation that enables social containment while appearing
fairer than discriminatory practices of a previous era”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 563 (2018) (claiming that automated policing “may exacerbate social inequalities
in ways that have to be addressed”).
30. See Capers, supra note 28, at 1290; Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401–05 (2003) (arguing that poorer people and their property
generally receive weaker Fourth Amendment protection than others); William J. Stuntz, The
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz,
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probation and parole have, admittedly, long existed in a legal “netherworld” in
that they are neither in prison nor totally free.31 Both people on community
supervision and in prison inevitably have certain rights curtailed as conditions
of their sentence. Yet these conditions—from strip searches to mandatory drug
testing—must still pass constitutional muster.32
This Article explores and critiques this puzzling privacy disparity, offering
both an explanatory account for its insidious rise and a reformist path forward.
As explained below, this growing disparity does not reflect a public consensus
that those on community supervision should have even less privacy than in the
past. Rather, the disparity stems from two underappreciated but seismic shifts
in Fourth Amendment law. First, courts are increasingly invoking consent to
justify otherwise unconstitutional intrusions upon supervisees, the premise
being that a defendant consents to surveillance in exchange for avoiding
incarceration.33 While the debate over criminal justice bargaining is not new, the
expanded reliance on consent in this context reveals significant blind spots in
the existing debate. Second, otherwise unconstitutional surveillance is
increasingly justified based on a general “reasonableness” standard, as opposed
to traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.34
These two shifts, which untether electronic surveillance from any
meaningful constitutional restraint, set a new precedent that jeopardizes the
precise privacy interests the Fourth Amendment drafters sought to protect,
which is discussed later in this piece. Unlike physical searches conducted
occasionally by police and supervision officers, electronic searches have no
natural limit and can be conducted continually without defendants knowing if,
or when, they are being surveilled. The result is a highly racialized panopticon
of unprecedented proportion.35 Meanwhile, no empirical evidence suggests that
broadly applied electronic surveillance corresponds to greater public safety,
increased rehabilitation, or lower recidivism rates.36 Indeed, “probation by
machine” may in fact lead to greater rates of re-arrest and incarceration, and in
turn be criminogenic, by focusing on perfect detection and enforcement of
The Distribution] (observing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has had the unintended
consequence of lowering the relative cost for state police to observe and invade the privacy of poorer
individuals).
31. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES 144
(2008).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-race-technology.html
[https://perma.cc/6T47-GCG2 (dark archive)] (arguing that “digital prisons are to mass incarceration
what Jim Crow was to slavery”).
36. See KATHRYN SALTMARSH, ILL. SENTENCING POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESEARCH
BRIEFING: STATE USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 6–8 (2019).
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violations of technical rules drafted with the limits of the physical world in
mind.
The profound Fourth Amendment implications of invasive electronic
surveillance of people on probation and parole have, until now, not been well
examined. While scholars, as well as the mainstream media, have begun to
expose the hidden costs of electronic monitoring, none of the critiques focus on
the unique Fourth Amendment problems with this level of broad surveillance.37
And while other scholars have examined how technology is altering policing and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as other forms of criminal justice
surveillance,38 the same robust scrutiny has yet to be applied to surveillance of
those on community supervision, a unique context because of its perceived status
as a lenient alternative to incarceration. Additionally, the rich literature on
probation and parole has yet to address the degree to which surveillance
technology challenges the traditional legal justifications for diminished privacy
rights for those on community supervision.39
37. See Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 2, 2 (2019);
Catherine Crump, Tracking the Trackers: An Examination of Electronic Monitoring of Youth in Practice, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 800–01 (2019) (explaining the negative effect of electronic monitoring as a
net-widening tool); Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 128 (2017)
(opposing judicial and legislative definitions of electronic monitoring as “merely regulatory”); Ben A.
McJunkin & J.J. Prescott, Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex
Offenders, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 379, 419 (2018) (arguing against the tendency to “discount the
intrusion” of electronic monitoring by comparing it to searches of prisoners’ cells); Weisburd, supra
note 8, at 305 (noting that electronic monitoring, like other “non-carceral treatment of juveniles,” is
“rarely subjected to effective legal regulation or rigorous analysis”); James Kilgore & Emmett Sanders,
Ankle Monitors Aren’t Humane. They’re Another Kind of Jail, WIRED (Aug. 4, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-ankle-monitors-are-another-kind-of-jail/?verso=true
[https://perma.cc/M7PJ-HKMU]; Kofman, supra note 6 (describing contract charging defendants ten
dollars per day to wear an electronic monitoring blanket); Patricia J. Williams, Why Everyone Should
Care About Mass E-Carceration, NATION (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/
surveillance-prison-race-technology/ [https://perma.cc/G527-2MEL] (citing a 2014 case in which a
defendant’s ankle monitor was removed for the duration of his trial after his attorney filed a complaint
detailing how police and prosecutors could listen to defendant’s conversations without consent).
38. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3
(2008) (describing the nation’s current use of data to prevent crime as a progression that began with
the War on Terror); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 550 (2017) (asking whether a consumer’s smart data is protected by the Fourth Amendment); Joh,
supra note 29, at 560; Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
313 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, The Mosaic Theory] (describing the Supreme Court’s application of
collective “mosaic” theory to define Fourth Amendment searches); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and
the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (listing types of data
available to government through data collection).
39. For comprehensive critiques of community supervision, see, for example, Fiona Doherty,
Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L. J. 291, 294 (2016), for
an examination of probation systems’ “almost farcical level of control over people’s lives,” and Michelle
S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW &
POL’Y 51, 52–53 (2013) [hereinafter Phelps, The Paradox of Probation], for a description of probation as
both a net widener and an alternative to traditional incarceration.
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This Article is the first to interrogate the Fourth Amendment
consequences of electronic surveillance of people on community supervision.
Part I chronicles the expansion of electronic surveillance in the context of
community supervision and why it has flown under the scholarly and legislative
radar. Part II of the Article documents and critiques the increased use of consent
as a justification for perpetual electronic surveillance. This part of the Article
challenges the assumption that defendants freely and knowingly “choose”
supervision conditioned on electronic surveillance over incarceration and
reveals how electronic surveillance is often not an alternative to incarceration
but simply an add-on. Part III examines the erosion of the traditional “special
needs” warrant exception and the emergence of the “reasonableness” standard
as a basis to justify electronic surveillance of people on community supervision.
Part IV then explores the unique way that electronic surveillance reveals deep
fissures in the reasonableness standard.
The Article concludes with a prediction and a prescription. The prediction
is that the increased reliance on consent and general “reasonableness” will
extend beyond the supervision context, representing a new and troubling
frontier of sanctioning suspicionless, warrantless searches with no natural limits.
The prescription is two-fold: (1) require a warrant for electronic surveillance of
supervisees while retaining the ability to conduct physical searches based on
“special needs”; and (2) decrease reliance on intensive community supervision
and electronic surveillance as de facto sentences. This shift would curb net
widening and help restore community supervision to its proper role as a more
precisely targeted intervention.
I. MECHANISMS OF SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES
This part both offers an overview of types of surveillance used in
community supervision and charts the expansion of surveillance, noting the
extreme dearth of data and research on these subjects.40 This part highlights two
points. The first is that the expansion does not appear to be the result of
deliberate policymaking based on rational penological concerns related to
community supervision. The second is that this unprecedented level of
surveillance would be unconstitutional under recent Fourth Amendment case
law related to electronic searches, absent the ability to rely on consent or a newly
created roving “reasonableness” standard.
40. This Article is part of a larger research project aimed at better understanding how electronic
monitoring operates in the criminal legal system. As part of this project, I am collecting agency policies
that govern the use of electronic monitoring for people on pretrial release, probation, parole, and other
forms of court supervision. These records include the terms and conditions of electronic monitoring,
internal agency policies, as well as the contracts between municipalities and private companies that
provide electronic monitoring services. Many of the agency records referenced in this paper are part
of this larger research endeavor.
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Taxonomy of Electronic Surveillance in Community Supervision

Increasingly precise surveillance technology emerges every day. What
follows are a few common types of surveillance currently used to monitor
people on probation, parole, and other forms of supervised release.41
1. Electronic Monitoring Technology
All fifty states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia use
some form of electronic monitoring to track the movement and activities of
people on pretrial release, probation, and parole.42 According to a Pew
Charitable Trusts research report, there were about 131,000 people on electronic
monitors in 2015, which represented a one hundred forty percent increase over
the prior ten years.43 The number of people on monitors today is likely much
higher as monitoring has proliferated and expanded to include juveniles and
people in immigration proceedings.44
People on community supervision are subject to electronic monitoring in
several different ways. The first is radio frequency monitoring, which tracks
whether someone is at a particular location, most often their home.45 This
system relies on a transmitter worn by a defendant that is connected to a
landline phone and alerts the probation officer if the defendant leaves his or her
home.46 The use of this system skyrocketed in the 1980s, and, although it is used
less now, some states and federal courts continue to rely on it.47
The second and more widely used technology is a GPS-equipped ankle
monitor that relies on cell phone towers and satellites to, according to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “pinpoint the actual location of the
offender and track an offender’s movements over time.”48 The ankle monitors

41. Although the focus of this Article is the use of electronic surveillance of people on probation
and parole, the same technology is also used in the context of pretrial release and lifetime GPS
monitoring of sex offenders. Many of the arguments presented in this Article apply with equal force
to those settings, but both settings have additional attributes that complicate the analysis and are
beyond the scope of this Article.
42. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7.
43. Id.
44. See Kofman, supra note 6. This number also did not include children. For example, in
California alone there were 10,000 children on electronic monitors in 2017. See Crump, supra note 37,
at 797. Determining the precise number of people on a GPS monitor should be a high priority for
future research.
45. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. INT’L. ASS’N. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRACKING SEX OFFENDERS WITH ELECTRONIC
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS AND PRACTICAL USES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3
(2008).
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vary in size, but most are the size of a cigarette box.49 The accompanying
software allows the location of people on monitors to be viewed, stored, and
analyzed by the private company administrating the program, probation and
parole agents, the police, or some combination thereof.50 Generally, these
devices must be charged at least once a day.51 Some have the capacity to buzz or
beep when an officer tries to contact the probationer or if the battery is low.52
Other varieties of monitors have two-way microphones that allow officials to
talk with people on monitors at any time.53
A third form of surveillance involves smartphone applications that allow
GPS tracking via cell phones and instant communication without the use of a
GPS-equipped ankle monitor.54 These systems vary but often rely on a GPSequipped cell phone and a small ankle strap that must be within the range of
the cell phone at all times.55 Both the cell phone and strap vibrate and emit
audible alerts when they are separated.56 Another variation involves a cell phone
without an ankle monitor and requires the defendant to submit to random and
frequent voice verification check-ins.57
Common across these variations is the use of a range of applications that
allow monitoring of compliance with exclusion zones, curfew, exact pinpoint
location, and video or photo check-ins. Some applications also allow probation
49. For images of GPS devices, see BI ExacuTrack One, BI, https://bi.com/products-andservices/exacutrack-one-gps-monitoring-device-remote-location-technology/
[https://perma.cc/7PDV-P2LR].
50. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 7, at 2.
51. A number of jurisdictions require that defendants charge their devices at least once a day. See,
e.g., ADULT PROB. DEP’T, SUPREME COURT OF ARIZ., EXACUTRACK ONE GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM (GPS) RULES (2014) (on file with author); BUREAU OF CMTY. CORRS., DEL., DEP’T OF
CORR., CONDITIONS OF ADDENDUM FOR GPS PROGRAM (2016) (on file with author); COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC MONITORING/GPS
TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY.,
ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); IOWA DEP’T OF
CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT RULES (2017) (on file with
author); OFFICE OF OPERATIONS SUPERVISION PROGRAM, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR THE
D.C., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ONLY CONDITION (2015) (on file with author);
ORANGE CTY. PROB. DEP’T, TERMS & CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUOUS ELECTRONIC
MONITORING SUPERVISION VIA GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) (on file with author).
52. Telephone Interview with Rosa Bay, Attorney, East Bay Cmty. Law Ctr. (May 2019).
53. Kira Lerner, Chicago Is Tracking Kids with GPS Monitors That Can Call and Record Them Without
Consent, APPEAL (Apr. 8, 2019), https://theappeal.org/chicago-electronic- monitoring-wiretappingjuveniles/ [https://perma.cc/FL3B-357D].
54. Mike Nellis, “Better than Human?” Smartphones, Artificial Intelligence and Ultra-Punitive
Electronic Monitoring 5 (Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=df5f5a81-7279-d83e-ee436804a006c3fa&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/7R2U-ZPCE].
55. See Shubha Balasubramanyam & Jethro Antoine, Young Offenders, Electronic Monitoring, Cell
Phones, and Battery Life, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Summer 2019, at 4, 5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5–6.
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officers to send reminders about court dates, job opportunities, or other
appointments.58 Still other applications allow for instant breathalyzer tests, with
the results communicated to officials via Bluetooth technology.59 Related
technology includes sleep pattern analysis and general motion detection
analysis.60
Individual judges, and sometimes probation or parole officers, generally
have discretion to impose electronic surveillance as a condition of community
supervision or as a sanction for violations of community supervision, a decision
which is made either at sentencing or at subsequent status hearings.61 In some
places, state law mandates that certain classes of individuals be placed on
monitors.62 People on electronic monitors must also agree to abide by dozens of
rules, often in addition to the host of separate probation and parole conditions.63
2. Electronic Search Conditions and Computer Monitoring
With increasing frequency, judges and prosecutors require defendants to
agree to continuous suspicionless searches of their personal electronic devices
and electronic data as a condition of supervision. These search conditions allow
law enforcement to monitor supervisees’ e-mail, social media activity, texting,
location and cell phone usage, and all other information contained on devices,
twenty-four hours a day. For example, the following language is now common in
standard plea agreements in some federal jurisdictions: “The defendant shall
submit his person, residence, office vehicle, electronic devices and their data
(including cellphones, computers, and electronic storage media), and any property
under defendant’s control to a search. Such a search shall be conducted . . . at
any time, with or without suspicion.”64

58. See Nellis, supra note 54, at 5.
59. Several private companies offer this service. See, e.g., Alcohol Monitoring, SENTINEL SERVS.,
https://www.sentineladvantage.com/alcohol-monitoring/ [https://perma.cc/BX46-J3HG]; Visual
Alcohol Monitoring, HOUSE ARREST SERVICES, https://housearrest.com/products/visual-alcoholmonitoring [https://perma.cc/4AZ3-J7B5].
60. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 48, at 5. These features are used,
presumably, by state officials monitoring people on supervision.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 480 (D.C. 2019) (sanctioning the practice of
probation officers, not judges, deciding if and when to place people on electronic monitors).
62. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520c(2)(b), 750.520n(1) (Westlaw through P.A.
2019, No. 178, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th Legis.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40(b) (2019); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 301.48 (Westlaw through 2019 Act 76).
63. For a discussion of these rules, see infra Part II.
64. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Lockhart, No. 3:17-cr-00604-CRB (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (emphasis added) (child
pornography); see also Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Rodger, No. 4:18-cr-00352PJH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (sex trafficking of a
minor); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 5, United States v. Hasme, No. 3:19-cr-00552-WHA (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (wire fraud).
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Even if probation or parole conditions do not explicitly include an
electronic search condition, some courts have upheld such searches, once they
occur, as implicitly authorized by general probation and parole search
conditions.65
Both electronic monitoring and electronic searches produce a range of
data, including the person’s exact locations, both real-time and historical, as well
as the contents of cell phones.66 These data are then relied on by probation,
parole, and other law enforcement officers as evidence of noncompliance with
the terms of community supervision, or a new criminal allegation.67 As in United
States v. Jackson,68 police also often rely on electronic monitoring for crime
investigation—like identifying who was near a crime scene.69
Beyond judicial proceedings and police investigations, it is not at all clear
what happens to the collected data or with whom it is shared. In juvenile courts
in California, for example, only one county in the state explicitly notes in the
contract that the data from electronic monitoring will be stored and shared with
other agencies.70 In adult court, some electronic monitoring rules provide that
the data is shared with police,71 and conversely, some policies say nothing about
what happens to the collected data.72
B.

Explaining the Expansion

No one catalyst explains the increased use of electronic surveillance in
community supervision. Instead, the expansion has been gradual, irregular, and
was likely the result of several related forces. In this sense, the expansion

65. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 266 So. 3d 873, 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); see also United
States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding search of parolee’s cellphone).
But see In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749 (Cal. 2019) (striking down an electronic search condition
imposed on a child in juvenile court).
66. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 699 (Mass. 2019) (concluding that
police reliance on historic GPS-ankle monitor data from when defendant was on probation was
reasonable).
68. 214 A.3d 464, 480 (D.C. 2019).
69. In Boston, for example, police routinely rely on electronic monitoring data to “zero in on a
potential suspect or rule out someone with a record.” Alysha Palumbo, Cameras, GPS Technology Help
Boston Police Combat Crime, NECN NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.necn.com/news/local/_necn
__cameras__gps_technology_help_boston_police_combat_crime_necn/59041/
[https://perma.cc/
DNJ6-CTT9].
70. See LCA ELEC. MONITORING PROGRAMS, SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
CLIENT ENROLLMENT PACKET 1, 5 (2019) (on file with author).
71. See COURT COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC
MONITORING/GPS TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author).
72. See IOWA DEP’T OF CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT
ASSIGNMENT RULES (2019) (on file with author).
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mirrors the evolution of probation in general, which has been described as
“haphazard[] and with no real thought.”73
First, the expansion of electronic surveillance may be a spillover effect of
targeted electronic searches of supervisees charged or convicted of a subset of
serious crimes. For years, people convicted of certain crimes associated with
computers or the internet have routinely been required to have their computers
monitored by or provide their passwords to their probation officers. For
example, people convicted of receiving child pornography through the internet
may have limitations placed on their internet use while they are on probation.74
As of 2008, at least twenty-two states had laws requiring that people convicted
of certain child sex offenses be electronically monitored, and at least six states
require monitoring for life.75
In recent years, however, the use of surveillance technology has quietly
expanded beyond these few crimes. For example, under the First Step Act,
federal inmates qualified to be released may be placed on house arrest enforced
by electronic monitoring.76 And until recently, electronic searches and
surveillance of computers and personal devices were ordered in juvenile court
in California regardless of the underlying offense.77 Similarly, in Illinois, recent
research revealed that electronic monitoring was imposed in a wide range of
cases and not limited to a particular subset of serious offenses.78
Second, the rise of electronic surveillance may relate to increased pressure
on municipalities to cut short-term supervision costs and lower incarceration
rates at the front end rather than focus on quality of supervision and lowering
long-term recidivism rates.79 Bail reform efforts aimed at either eliminating cash
bail altogether or making it much easier for people to be released pretrial may
help explain the impetus for municipalities to find “alternatives” to

73. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 157 (1997) (citing DAVID
J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 244 (1980)).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
75. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 48, at 1.
76. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. Law No. 115-391, § 102, 132 Stat. 5194, 5211 (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(A)(i) (2018)).
77. In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 749–50 (Cal. 2019).
78. SALTMARSH, supra note 36, at 4.
79. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS TO
IMPROVE SAFETY AND REDUCE INCARCERATION 2 (2013), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
Publications/the-potential-of-community-corrections-to-improve-safety-and-reduce-incarcerationconfigure/legacy_downloads/potential-of-community-corrections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CA5EP8WP]; Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences, Over-Incarceration and the Erosion
of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753, 760 (2010) [hereinafter Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing]; Julie
O’Donoghue, Missouri Hopes Local Courts Agree to Electronic Monitoring To Cut Costs, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 26, 2019), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-hopes-local-courts-agreeelectronic-monitoring-cut-costs [https://perma.cc/42EY-C523].
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incarceration.80 In some places with newly enacted bail reform, like San
Francisco and St. Louis, the use of electronic monitoring has steadily increased.81
Pretrial agencies, advocates, and academics alike have highlighted monitoring
as a positive alternative to cash bail.82 At least one of the recently elected
prosecutors, who are seen as part of the “reform prosecutor” movement, has put
forth a new bail policy that explicitly provides for electronic monitoring as an
alternative to cash bail.83
As a result of the increased pressure to lower incarceration rates more
generally, the growth in the number of people on probation and parole has
recently, and significantly, outpaced the growth in the prison population.84 At
the same time, probation and parole agencies have always been historically
underfunded.85 As caseloads have gone up, probation and parole officers have
been asked to do more, but with fewer resources.86 Faced with such constraints,
“officers have little choice but to concentrate on surveillance, and the
impersonal monitoring of offenders.”87 Faye Taxman, director of the Center for
Advancing Correctional Excellence at George Mason University, explains that
“electronic monitoring and other data provide important information that can
be used in supervision . . . . This is an untapped resource.”88

80. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Editorial: New App-Based Defendant-Monitoring Program Is a Promising
Alternative to Bail, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/
editorial-new-app-based-defendant-monitoring-program-is-a-promising/article_7466fc29-ef8e-58758567-3372b8a904ff.html [https://perma.cc/7FXJ-A79J].
81. Michel Martin, Defendants Often Foot Bill of Costly Electronic Monitors, NPR (July 7, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/07/739357978/defendants-often-foot-bill-of-costly-electronic-anklemonitors [https://perma.cc/ST72-97Q5]; Joshua Sabatini, Number of Inmates Released on Electronic
Monitoring Triples Following
Bail
Ruling,
S.F.
EXAMINER
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.sfexaminer.com/the-city/number-of-inmates-released-on-electronic-monitoring-triplesfollowing-bail-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/PT39-ZXN4].
82. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1364 (2014); Reuven Blau, City Scrambling To Get Electronic Monitors for New Bail Rules, CITY (Jan. 17,
2020), https://thecity.nyc/2020/01/nyc-scrambling-to-get-electronic-monitors-for-new-bail-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/7KDH-9JWY]; O’Donoghue, supra note 79 (arguing that the ankle-bracelet program
would reduce the number of people in jail).
83. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, San Francisco Moves Forward with New System To
Replace Pre-Arraignment Case Bail (Nov. 6, 2019), https://sfmayor.org/article/san-francisco-movesforward-new-system-replace-pre-arraignment-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/MLQ5-2GHV].
84. DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36DN-MDSX].
85. Petersilia, supra note 73, at 152.
86. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 11; Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of
Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 439 (2011).
87. Scott-Hayward, supra note 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard P. Seiter,
Prison Reentry and the Role of Parole Officers, FED. PROB., Dec. 2002, at 50, 51).
88. Faye S. Taxman, Community Supervision in the Post Mass Incarceration Era, 79 FED. PROB. 41,
43 (2015).
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The third and related trend that may have incentivized and facilitated the
expansion of electronic surveillance in community supervision is the influence
of private industry.89 Surveillance technology is a big business.90 For example,
several large publicly traded companies offer private probation services as well
as a range of electronic monitoring programs.91 Private companies, with names
such as “Leaders in Community Alternatives,”92 advertise “evidence-based”
surveillance services such as “PureTag,” “PureTrack,” and “PureMonitor.”93
These private services are attractive to jurisdictions looking for ways to cheaply
but effectively expand community supervision.
C.

Justifying the Expansion

This section explains why electronic surveillance of this magnitude, absent
the newly emerging use of consent and general reasonableness as legal
justifications, would surely be unconstitutional under recent Supreme Court
cases constraining electronic surveillance.
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Riley v. California,94 Carpenter v.
United States,95 and United States v. Jones96 reflect the Court’s growing concern
with expansive electronic searches. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that cell
phones generally cannot be searched incident to arrest without a warrant.97
Although an arrestee has “reduced privacy interests upon being taken into
police custody,” the Court emphasized that this fact “does not mean that the
Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”98 The Court focused on
the unique privacy interests related to cell phones and cell phone data and
concluded that “when ‘privacy-related concerns are weighty enough’ a ‘search

89. Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: How Private Contractors Made and Are
Remaking the Modern Criminal Justice System – An Account of Convict Transportation and Electronic
Monitoring, 17 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 1, 24 (2016).
90. CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION:
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 16–17 (2014); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing
by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 66 (2014) [hereinafter Joh,
Policing by Numbers]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 30–33 (2017), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/NYULawReviewOnline-92-Joh_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R675-Z23M];.
91. See Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan
Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 154–
55 (2017); Weisburd, supra note 8, at 333.
92. See LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, https://www.lcaservices.com
[https://perma.cc/3LXE-YRWL].
93. See GPS Tracking, LEADERS IN COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, https://www.lcaservices.com/
copy-of-electronic-mointoring [https://perma.cc/279W-YTRH].
94. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
95. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
96. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
97. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
98. Id. at 392.
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may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy
of the arrestee.’”99
In Carpenter, the Court expressed similar concerns with respect to the
privacy implications of searching historic cell phone location data. The Court
observed that when the government tracks the location of a cell phone, “it
achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.”100 These concerns explain the Court’s decision to limit the thirdparty doctrine and instead require a warrant for the search of historic location
data at issue in Carpenter.101 As privacy expert Orin Kerr recently noted,
“Carpenter signals a new kind of expectation of privacy test, one that focuses on
how much the government can learn about a person regardless of the place or
thing from which the information came.”102
Similarly, in Jones, the Supreme Court relied on comparable logic in
holding that a GPS-tracking device attached to a suspect’s vehicle constituted a
search.103 The privacy concerns expressed by Justice Sotomayor in her
concurrence could apply with equal force to any type of government
surveillance:
[T]he government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that
GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter
the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical
to democratic society.”104
If there is one common theme uniting Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, it is that
“[d]igital [i]s [d]ifferent.”105 As a result, Fourth Amendment case law is
adapting, or, as Kerr describes it, experiencing an “equilibrium-adjustment” in
which Fourth Amendment law responds to “the digital age to restore the earlier
balance of government power.”106 Indeed, the logic behind limiting the thirdparty doctrine in Carpenter flows from the recent recognition that when people
use modern indispensable digital devices like cell phones, there is no voluntary

99. Id. (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013)).
100. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
101. Id. at 2223.
102. Orin Kerr, Implementing Carpenter in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 6) [hereinafter Kerr, Implementing Carpenter] (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
103. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012).
104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272,
285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
105. Granick, supra note 24.
106. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 102 (manuscript at 8).
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disclosure in a “meaningful sense.”107 Increased privacy protections for location
data is not limited to court decisions. The intrusiveness of government
electronic surveillance was precisely what the California Legislature intended to
limit when it passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“CalECPA”).108 The Act, arguably the most sweeping in the country,109 requires
that law enforcement obtain a search warrant to track the location of private
electronic devices and to search the data contained on them or on the internet.110
But these privacy-protective adjustments to digital Fourth Amendment
law have not been applied to people on probation and parole—ironically the
exact group that is in fact wearing the ankle monitor invoked by Chief Justice
Roberts in Carpenter,111 and is in fact routinely subject to the cell phone searches
condemned in Riley. To be sure, Kerr proposes that the protections of Carpenter
should apply when three requirements are met: (1) the records were made
available because of “surveillance methods of the digital age”; (2) the records are
not the “product of a user’s meaningful voluntary choice”; and (3) the records
are of a type that “tends to reveal an intimate portrait of a person’s life beyond
the legitimate interest of criminal investigations.”112 While these requirements
would seem easily met by electronic surveillance of supervisees, the protections
of Jones, Riley, and Carpenter have not been extended to people on probation and
parole. For example, soon after CalECPA went into effect, San Diego judges
began asking defendants to sign waivers allowing probation and police officers
to search their electronic devices without a warrant or even any suspicion of
wrongdoing.113 The state legislature soon followed suit. In 2017, CalECPA was
amended to clarify that the new protections did not apply to someone who is on
parole or “subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous
condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.”114
Courts have similarly refused to extend the holdings in Riley, Jones, and
Carpenter to those on community supervision.115 The closest the Supreme
107. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
108. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ch. 651, 2015 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(1) (Supp. 2020)).
109. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/2V5S-UYC2].
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(c)(1) (Supp. 2020).
111. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
112. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 102 (manuscript at 3).
113. Dana Littlefield, Does Digital Privacy Extend to Criminals on Probation?, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-court-waiver-cellphonepasswords-search-privacy-2016jan15-story.html [https://perma.cc/6S6G-HWFK].
114. § 1546.1(c)(10).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 412 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Pacheco,
884 F.3d 1031, 1043 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018); United States v. Johnson, 875
F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 2017); Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1018 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 478 (D.C. 2019);
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Court has come to addressing electronic searches was when it concluded that
GPS monitoring of people convicted of certain sex offenses constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment and remanded the case to the lower court to
determine if the search was reasonable.116 Similarly, a statute that barred those
convicted of certain sex offenses from accessing social media was struck down
as infringing on free speech. In doing so, the Court expressed the importance
of the internet as the “vast democratic forum[]” and to “foreclose access to social
media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise
of First Amendment rights.”117
Traditionally, courts justified probation searches based on the “special
government needs” exception to the warrant requirement. This exception
applies when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”118 The special
needs exception consists of a two-part inquiry: first, whether the search is being
conducted for a non-law enforcement purpose and, second, if there is a non-law
enforcement purpose, whether the search is reasonable.119 Warrantless searches
of public-school students120 and public employees,121 as well as sobriety check
points,122 to name a few, have all been upheld pursuant to the special needs
exception.
The “special needs” of Wisconsin’s probation department was what the
Court relied on in upholding a warrantless search of a probationer in Griffin v.
Wisconsin,123 one of the first probation-search cases. The “special need[]” the
Court referred to was probation’s function as a “period of genuine rehabilitation
and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”124
The Court concluded that this “regime” would be “unduly disrupted by a
requirement of probable cause.”125 Still, the majority in Griffin made clear that
a warrantless probation search must be justified by “reasonable grounds” to

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 680 (Mass. 2019); State v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762, 774 (Vt.
2017). But see United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (invalidating suspicionless search
of probationer’s cell phone as unreasonable where the suspected probation violation was missing a
probation appointment); In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2019) (invoking Riley as part of the
basis to strike down an electronic search condition).
116. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 309–10 (2015).
117. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, 1737 (2017).
118. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 351–54.
120. Id. at 347–48 (majority opinion).
121. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
122. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
123. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
124. Id. at 875.
125. Id. at 878.
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believe the area searched will contain contraband and that the ability to infringe
on a probationer’s privacy is “not unlimited.”126
Even this qualified approach drew strong criticism from Justice Blackmun
who, in his dissent, questioned the majority’s “curious assumption that the
probationer will benefit by dispensing with the warrant requirement.”127 This
criticism foreshadowed what would ultimately come to fruition: when it comes
to probation and parole searches, the line between the “special” needs of
community supervision and traditional law enforcement purposes is hard, if not
impossible, to discern.128 For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals in the Jackson
case upheld electronic monitoring of people on probation as a special needs
search,129 while the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that electronic
monitoring of people convicted of sex offenses was not a special needs search.130
Given these line-drawing problems, the special needs doctrine is not often
relied on to justify electronic surveillance. Instead, courts most often invoke
one or both of the following justifications for suspicionless and warrantless
searches: consent and general “reasonableness.” In the next two parts, I address
why the emergence of these two justifications is doctrinally concerning.
Electronic surveillance, in particular, brings into sharp focus the deep fissures
in the consent and “reasonableness” doctrines.
II. “CONSENSUAL” SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES
Perhaps because electronic searches are distinctively more invasive than
an occasional physical search, courts—with more frequency—are now invoking
consent as a justification, either by itself,131 or in combination with a relaxed
totality-of-the-circumstances approach.132 Although many scholars and jurists

126. Id. at 875.
127. Id. at 886 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
128. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for
Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 294 (2016) (observing that “the special needs test has proven
incapable of coherent application”).
129. United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 467 (D.C. 2019).
130. State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 525–26, 831 S.E.2d 542, 556 (2019).
131. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 847 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2017) (upholding electronic
search clause because defendant agreed to it as a condition of release); People v. Nachbar, 3 Cal. App.
5th 1122, 1129 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding electronic search condition on grounds that defendant
“accepted probation in lieu of additional punishment”); People v. Thornburg, 895 N.E.2d 13, 23–24
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (upholding computer search term based on defendant’s consent to the terms); State
v. Gonzalez, 862 N.W.2d 535, 542 (N.D. 2015) (upholding computer search condition on the grounds
that “the probationer consents to warrantless searches . . . when he accepts the conditions of
probation”).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 412 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Bare,
806 F.3d 1011, 1018 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015); People v. Smith; 8 Cal. App. 5th 977, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017);
State v. White, 890 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D. 2017); State v. Keller, 893 N.W.2d 276, 278–79 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2017).
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have opined on the problems with consent-based searches,133 consensual
electronic surveillance of people on community supervision brings to light
additional concerns. This part of the Article charts the emergence of the consent
justification for electronic surveillance of people on community supervision and
then demonstrates why it developed in a way that is doctrinally unsound.
A.

The Rise of Consent

Consent, either on its own or as a factor, has recently emerged as an oftinvoked justification by government officials for imposing otherwise
unconstitutional electronic searches or surveillance of people on community
supervision.134 The consent is usually either explicit (for example, a defendant
agrees to an electronic search condition as part of a plea agreement or condition
of probation)135 or implicit (for example, a defendant agrees to a traditional
search condition that is later determined to include electronic searches).136
Consent takes other forms as well. For example, people placed on electronic
monitors are usually required to sign a contract or sign their initials, indicating
that they agree to, or are at least aware of, the rules governing the monitoring
program.137 These rules often include a provision that failure to comply or the
decision to opt out of the program may result in incarceration.138
133. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA.
L. REV. 509 (2015) (analyzing the reasonableness test and consent searches); Philip Hamburger,
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 480 (2012) (concluding that
“consent is irrelevant for conditions that go beyond the government’s power”); Nirej Sekhon, Willing
Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 103 (2011) (providing a framework for reforming “fictional consent”); William J. Stuntz,
Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992)
(supporting the special needs doctrine and analogizing to contract law).
134. See McCoy, 847 F.3d at 605 (upholding electronic search clause because defendant agreed to
it as a condition of release); Nachbar, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1129 (upholding electronic search condition on
grounds that defendant “accepted probation in lieu of additional punishment“); Thornburg, 895 N.E.2d
at 23–24 (upholding computer search term based on defendant’s consent to the terms); Gonzalez, 862
N.W.2d at 542 (upholding computer search condition on the grounds that “the probationer consents
to warrantless searches . . . when he accepts the conditions of probation”); State v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762,
776 (Vt. 2017) (upholding electronic monitoring on grounds that defendant “agreed” to it as a condition
of probation).
135. See, e.g., McCoy, 847 F.3d at 605.
136. State v. Lietzau, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0011, 2019 WL 1323981, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 25,
2019).
137. See, e.g., STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, COR.14.22, ELECTRONIC MONITORING
SERVICE
CORRECTIONAL
POLICY
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://dps.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/COR.14.22.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFG-B9DW]; see also COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC MONITORING/GPS
TRACKING UNIT RULES (2019) (on file with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY.,
ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); IOWA DEP’T OF
CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT RULES (2017) (on file with
author).
138. See sources cited supra note 137.
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Although lower courts increasingly rely on consent as a legal basis to
impose probation and parole searches, the Supreme Court has declined to
resolve the question of consent each of the two times it was given the
opportunity to do so. United States v. Knights139 presented the first such
opportunity. In that case, the Court granted certiorari on the precise question
of whether Mr. Knights’s agreement to a probation condition allowing for
warrantless searches constituted valid consent.140 And yet, the Court made a
point to “not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search condition
constituted consent” because it concluded that the search was reasonable under
a “general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the
circumstances.’”141
Despite the Court’s explicit decision not to address consent, it implicitly
suggested that being “aware” of a search condition is relevant to the general
reasonableness test. The Court focused on the fact that Mr. Knights was
“unambiguously informed” of the search condition, the fact which “significantly
diminished [his] reasonable expectation of privacy.”142 The Court observed that
the “judge who sentenced Knights to probation determined that it was necessary
to condition the probation on Knights’ acceptance of the search provision.”143
Although simply being aware of a probation condition is not the same as
consenting to it, the Court’s reasoning seems premised on the assumption that
Mr. Knights could have—but did not—object to it. Being “informed of” and
“accepting” terms are certainly species of consent.
Oral argument from Knights further reveals the Court’s concerns with
consent in the context of probation. Justice Souter, for example, seemed to
question the utility of labeling probation an “agreement” because in some cases
a defendant is ineligible for a sentence of incarceration or has, in effect, been
ordered onto probation, allowing no opportunity to actually “agree” to the
individual terms of probation.144 Justices Ginsberg and Stevens also appeared to
be concerned that consent in cases where a defendant could face jail time is
coercive and may be an unconstitutional condition.145 These varied views may
explain why the Court did not ultimately rule on consent grounds and instead
relied on a general reasonableness standard.
The second time the Court addressed, but did not resolve, the question of
consent-based community supervision searches was five years later in Samson v.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

534 U.S. 112 (2001).
See Brief for Respondent at 1, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 00-1260).
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 119.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 00-1260).
Id. at 23.
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California.146 In Samson, the Court concluded that a parole search was reasonable
even though there was no suspicion for the search.147 The Court’s focus this time
was on the significantly diminished expectations of privacy for people on parole
as compared to people on probation. Like in Knights, the Court did not explicitly
resolve the question of consent but did focus on the fact that Mr. Samson
“signed an order submitting” to the search condition and was thus
“unambiguously’ aware of it.”148 Nonetheless, the Court made clear in a footnote
that it was not invoking the special needs doctrine or consent because the search
was deemed “reasonable” under a totality-of-circumstances test.149
Despite the Court having yet to rule on the legality of consent-based
searches, there is a near-perfect circuit split as to whether consent, and consent
alone, is sufficient to justify a probation or parole search. On one side, many
lower courts have found that explicit search conditions constitute a valid waiver
of Fourth Amendment rights.150 And yet other courts have firmly rejected the
notion that a warrantless search condition is “the price the government may
exact in return for granting probation.”151 Courts have found, and judges have
argued, that the search conditions were essentially nonconsensual, not that
consent, if voluntary, is an insufficient justification.152
The next section provides an argument that this reliance on consent is not
only contrary to the realities on the ground, in terms of the voluntariness of the
choice, but also—even assuming “knowing and voluntary” consent—is an
illegitimate justification for such searches, outside a narrow subset of offenses.
B.

Concerning Consent

The consent justification rests on the general premise that probation is “an
act of clemency and grace” and that “[b]ecause a defendant has no right to
probation, the trial court can impose probation conditions that it could not
146. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
147. Id. at 846.
148. Id. at 852.
149. Id. at 852 n.3.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a
“blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights” was valid since “imprisonment is a greater invasion of
personal privacy than being exposed to searches of one’s home on demand”); People v. Woods, 981
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Cal. 1999) (“In California, probationers may validly consent in advance to warrantless
searches in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.”).
151. United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016).
152. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that a consent-search provision in a parole agreement was coercive and involuntary); Roman v.
State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241–42 (Alaska 1977) (holding that released defendants do not voluntarily consent
to all conditions of parole); see also People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 457–58 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J.,
concurring) (arguing that suspicionless searches of parolees cannot be justified by consent if a
prospective parolee does not have freedom to accept or reject parole); Guiney v. Police Comm’r, 582
N.E.2d 523, 531 (Mass. 1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that consent to search is “virtually
meaningless unless the consent requirement [is] ‘reasonable’”).
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otherwise impose.”153 The presumption is that “[i]f the defendant finds the
conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise
face, he may refuse probation.”154 Thus, otherwise onerous probation conditions
have been upheld on the grounds that a probationer can always reject
probation.155
To date, both litigants and jurists have yet to focus on how consent is
uniquely problematic in the context of electronic surveillance of people on
community supervision. This section posits that blanket use of consent is
troubling on two levels. First, many people’s decision to consent to search
conditions or electronic monitoring cannot be said to be “knowing” or
“voluntary” under even the most forgiving, government-friendly conceptions of
those terms. Defendants, just like most people, underappreciate the risks of
complex electronic searches, a concern that is ever-present in all criminal justice
bargaining but heightened in the digital privacy arena.156 Second, electronic
monitoring and search conditions are very often “add-ons” rather than
bargained-for conditions in exchange for a real reduction in harshness of
punishment.
1. The Lack of a “Knowing” and “Voluntary” Waiver
The first problem with consent is that a defendant’s acceptance of
electronic surveillance as a condition of supervision may be neither knowing nor
voluntary, even under traditional waiver doctrine, which generally defers to free
market principles. It is axiomatic that the legal rights of the accused are “subject
to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties.”157 The rights of a criminal
defendant “serve as just another kind of bargaining chip,”158 where waiver of
rights is treated as simply part of the “mutuality of advantage” that characterizes
plea negotiations.159 Applying this doctrine, courts have accepted as valid the
153. People v. Anderson, 235 P.3d 11, 20 (Cal. 2010); see also People v. Ebertowski, 228 Cal. App.
4th 1170, 1175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding computer search term because “[a]dult probationers, in
preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights”
(internal quotation omitted) (quoting People v. Olguin, 198 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2008))).
154. Anderson, 235 P.3d at 20.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1969) (explaining that defendant
“could have rejected probation and elected prison” and that, having “chose[n] to enjoy the benefits of
probation,” the defendant had to “endure its restrictions”); see also Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, PopPsychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 84–90 (2000) [hereinafter Horwitz, Coercion].
156. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879 (2013) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy Self-Management] (proposing ways to
square privacy law and consent).
157. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995).
158. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 845 (2003).
159. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“[P]lea bargaining flows from ‘the
mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid
trial” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970))).

98 N.C. L. REV. 717 (2020)

2020]

SUPERVISION BY SURVEILLANCE

741

waiver of a host of fundamental trial rights as a condition of pleas.160 Yet even
under traditional waiver doctrine, consent assumes transparency, equal access to
knowledge, and opportunity for defendants to make a decision that is in their
own best interest.161
However, some people subject to electronic surveillance never literally
“choose” surveillance as an alternative to incarceration. For example, probation
and parole are frequently part of mixed sentences—usually, a defendant will be
sentenced to a jail or prison term, in addition to a term of probation or parole.162
In the federal system, as well as in some state systems, defendants cannot “opt
out” of supervision; they are sentenced to a prison term followed by a
mandatory term of supervised release.163 In such cases, even though the
defendant has not explicitly consented to the conditions of supervision, courts
will often impose or uphold supervision terms as implicitly consensual in the
sense that the defendant has acquiesced to a sentence that includes a term of
supervision. Furthermore, the term of supervised release is on top of a period
of incarceration and does not replace the prison sentence. In this way,
supervised release is not an alternative to prison. And yet, the very term “search
condition” linguistically reflects an assumption that community supervision is
always a privilege because the alternative would be jail—even if the reality is
that a defendant has no actual choice.164
Even if a defendant chooses probation or parole as an alternative to
incarceration, he might not have all of the information necessary to choose
between supervision conditioned upon electronic surveillance and a prison
sentence. The legal and practical implications of waiving Fourth Amendment
rights are opaque and not obvious. For example, people contemplating plea
offers are often unaware of the full collateral consequences of a conviction.165 As
in other contexts, such as Miranda warnings, waiver assumes an understanding
of the benefits and risks.166

160. See, e.g., Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2029 (2000).
161. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 911 (2006) (proposing criminal justice reforms).
162. Doherty, supra note 39, at 339–42.
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
164. Several states (including New York and Illinois) follow the federal system in that defendants
serve a portion of their sentence in prison and are then are ordered onto parole or supervised release.
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-7 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-629); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.40 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2020).
165. See generally Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 120 (2009) (arguing that “only a
constitutional mandate that requires a complete and full informational disclosure about the serious
collateral consequences of guilty pleas will avoid the problematic incentive structures we have now”).
166. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1563 (2008).
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Moreover, in the context of conditions attached to plea offers, where the
alternative is to go to trial and face a potentially harsher sentence, defendants
rarely have access to all the pertinent facts about the evidence in their case or the
likelihood of prevailing at trial.167 Indeed, in some jurisdictions, defendants
accept guilty pleas (and the attendant conditions) without ever speaking to an
attorney.168 And even if a lawyer is available, many court-appointed attorneys
are underresourced and have little time to explain the consequences of various
options.169 Indeed, the scene is a familiar one: a defendant speaks with his
attorney in the hallway or in a holding cell, and a few minutes later, he pleads
guilty.170 At sentencing the judge lists off the conditions of a plea, not further
inquiring if the defendant understands such conditions. Although it is unknown
how often electronic monitoring is part of a plea agreement, the rate of plea
agreements is undisputedly high—roughly ninety percent of all criminal cases
are resolved through plea agreements.171
In short, few meaningful opportunities exist for defendants to gain the
necessary information before waiving procedural rights as part of a plea or offer
of a more lenient sentence. To state this proposition is not to suggest that
defendants lack personal agency. Rather, the criminal legal system, arguably by
design, provides limited opportunities for people to meaningfully exercise
agency and make decisions that are in their own best interest.172 As other
scholars have observed, the field upon which pleas and probation conditions are
negotiated is rarely level and the bargaining power between prosecutor and
defendant is rarely equal.173 While the appropriate response to these
asymmetries of power is not necessarily to invalidate all plea agreements, a

167. For example, a plea offer with a condition of electronic surveillance might expire before a
defendant has the chance to interview witnesses, conduct a preliminary hearing, wait to see if the grand
jury indicts him, review prior statements of the government’s witnesses, wait for forensic testing results
to come back, or try to interview and subpoena alibi or other defense witnesses.
168. See, e.g., Andrea Roth, “Spit and Acquit”: Prosecutors as Surveillance Entrepreneurs, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 405, 417 (2019) [hereinafter Roth, Spit and Acquit] (describing Orange County practice of
conditioning unrepresented misdemeanants’ pleas on giving a DNA sample).
169. See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?,
75 MO. L. REV. 683, 683–84 (2010) (describing the state of indigent defense).
170. See STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 124–25 (2006). See generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW
AMERICA HOLDS COURT (2009) (discussing the everyday challenges of indigent defense
representation and the mistakes made by the legal community that facilitate those challenges).
171. LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 3
(2011),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearch
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/53G4-64RE].
172. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 257–58 (2018).
173. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Prosecution of Black Men, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 182
(Angela J. Davis, ed. 2017) (discussing the broad and far-reaching power of prosecutors due to
asymmetries of power inherent in plea bargaining).
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recognition of such imbalances should loom large over any proposal upholding
“consent” as a blanket justification without further scrutiny.
These ever-present concerns about ignorance, misinformation, and
rationality in traditional plea bargaining are compounded in the context of
electronic surveillance conditions. Professor Paul Schwartz has noted that
“citizens are often unaware of, or unable to evaluate, the increasingly
sophisticated methods devised to collect information about them.”174
Appreciating the risks of electronic surveillance is uniquely challenging. And as
Professor Daniel Solove has observed, “Despite the embrace of notice and
choice, people do not seem to be engaging in much privacy self-management”;
instead, people “routinely turn over their data for very small benefits.”175 One
interpretation of such failure to self-protect might be that people do not care
about privacy. But as Professors Solove, Chris Hoofnagle, Jan Whittington, and
others have shown, poor privacy decisions are driven mostly by misinformation,
misunderstanding, and underappreciation of downstream risks—not because
people devalue privacy.176
2. The Lack of a True Discount: Unconstitutional Conditions
a. The Failure To Focus on “Wrongful Coercion” in the Absence of a True
Discount
Both sides of the recurring debate over criminal justice bargaining agree
that deals are invalid unless they are knowing and voluntary. But once a decision
to accept a deal meets these requirements, the sides diverge and take two paths
of reasoning, both problematic. This section argues that both sides of the debate
have incorrectly focused on whether a reasonable defendant feels free to say no
to a condition that avoids incarceration. Instead, the correct focus should be on
whether the condition offers a true discount off of the sentence that the
defendant would have otherwise been entitled to receive.
One side of the existing debate over criminal justice bargaining—the
winning side, thus far—views bargaining between the prosecution and a
defendant as unproblematic so long as the defendant’s decision to accept a deal
is “knowing” and “voluntary” in the sense that it is informed by accurate
information and that the defendant has the ability to refuse the deal.177 Under
this view, so long as a defendant has the ability to “refuse probation” if he “finds

174. Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2056 (2004).
175. Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 156, at 1884, 1886.
176. See id. at 1888; Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1327, 1356 (2012).
177. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–64 (1978); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
244 (1969).
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the conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise
face,”178 the deal is unproblematic.
This logic, however, has a limit. In other contexts, the mere fact that a
waiver of a right is knowing and voluntary does not render it legally
unproblematic. If the bargain is not a true discount from what the bargainer
should fairly expect otherwise, then the deal is still problematic, even if it is
knowing and voluntary. This “unconstitutional conditions”179 doctrine “reflects
the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not
do directly”180 and has been applied by courts in several contexts outside
criminal law.181
For example, imagine if the Governor of California decided to condition
the granting of state park passes on California residents’ willingness to waive
their Fourth Amendment rights and submit to routine continuous suspicionless
electronic surveillance. The state park pass is clearly a privilege, not a right—
the state of California could constitutionally decline to have parks at all or could
constitutionally decline to allow human access to them, keeping them as wildlife
refuges. But to condition such a privilege on the waiver of a constitutional right
would presumably run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. While
the current doctrinal standard for what does and does not constitute such an
unconstitutional condition remains infamously murky at best,182 the park pass
example would surely be illegal under any conception of the test. The condition
is not “related” to the state’s decision to grant a pass,183 and in a world where
imposing electronic surveillance were not a possibility, the state would surely
just grant the park passes unconditionally rather than withholding them.
There seems to be little reason, aside from inertia and tradition, not to
recognize such wrongfully coercive conditions as invalid in the criminal justice
context as well. While there may be difficult questions to address in terms of
which deals run afoul of the doctrine and what the right baseline is, the idea
that such reasonable limits on conditional offers would have no application in
the criminal context makes little sense. While scholars such as Mitch Berman
and Josh Bowers have persuasively argued that the doctrine is applicable in the
178. People v. Anderson, 235 P.3d 11, 20 (Cal. 2010).
179. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989)
(suggesting a defense of “close scrutiny”).
180. Id. at 1415.
181. See Mazzone, supra note 158, at 805 (compiling examples of unconstitutional conditions
doctrine applied in non-criminal settings).
182. See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract
Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 914 (2006) (describing how the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine “has long been considered an intellectual and doctrinal swamp”).
183. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (noting that “conditions on federal
grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs’” (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978))).
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plea-bargaining context,184 the argument has gained little traction in
challenging plea agreements in real criminal cases and has generated little
scholarship outside of the plea-bargaining context.185
On the other side of the debate, critics of criminal justice bargaining have
equally failed to recognize that in some situations a plea offer may in fact reflect
a “true discount” thus making the plea less coercive. Instead, critics and litigants
have almost exclusively relied on the argument that a choice between “freedom
and prison” is inherently coercive because the alternative of prison is so harsh
that no defendant would ever refuse the deal. For example, in his dissent in
Samson, Justice Stevens characterized the notion of a parolee’s consent to
suspicionless physical searches as “sophistry” and that to speak of consent when
the choice is freedom or prison is to “resort to a ‘manifest fiction.’”186
This critique, though perhaps intuitive, is both over- and underinclusive
and fails to recognize the crux of the problem. The mere fact that an offer is too
good to refuse, given the “unpleasant alternative[],” should be neither necessary
nor sufficient to render a criminal justice bargaining process invalid.187 A plea
deal that is the product of a fully informed choice and offers a true discount off a
harsher sentence that a defendant would otherwise justifiably receive should not
be condemned as inherently problematic simply because a reasonable defendant
would find it difficult to refuse the deal. While it may be difficult to discern
what constitutes a “justifiable” sentence, evidence such as sentencing guidelines
and historical charging data could provide insight into what sentence a properly
motivated prosecutor would have sought in a world without the condition at
issue. If the deal really is a discount and accepting is a knowing and voluntary
choice, then the only remaining reasons to disallow the deal would seem to be
unconscionability or inherent objections to commodifying certain rights.188
b.

Why Electronic Surveillance May Not Be a True Discount

For most people on some form of community supervision, warrantless
electronic searches and surveillance often offer no real discount. The baseline in
184. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 99 (2001); Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1083, 1089 (2016).
185. The one exception thus far appears to be the application of the doctrine to DNA sampling as
a condition of dismissals and pleas. See Roth, Spit and Acquit, supra note 168, at 417.
186. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 863 n.4 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 5
WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.10(b),
at 440–41 (4th ed. 2004)).
187. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
188. Of course, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is no panacea for the myriad of other
concerns with plea bargaining in the criminal legal system, such as institutional racism, prosecutorial
misconduct, and the politics of law-and-order policing. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash
the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/
sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/F8WR-ZA4D (dark archive)].
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many probation and parole cases—that is, the sentence the state would
legitimately seek if electronic searches were not an option—is not prison.
Instead, most supervisees would likely still receive probation or parole.189 In this
way, people agreeing to an electronic search condition do not get any sentence
“discount” because there is no actual benefit.190 The ostensible benefit—
avoiding incarceration—places the defendant in no better stead than he would
have been absent the state’s ability to condition release on accepting an electronic
search condition.191 In turn, where the threatened penalty for rejecting the offer
is as harsh as incarceration, most people—though technically able to reject the
deal—are likely to accept the unconstitutional search condition.
Perhaps these concerns have motivated the few courts that have invoked
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate otherwise consensual
searches of nonincarcerated defendants.192 For example, the Ninth Circuit
determined that consent could not be the sole basis to uphold an otherwise
unreasonable search conducted pursuant to a pretrial release agreement.193 In its
opinion, the court cautioned that giving “the government free rein to grant
conditional benefits creates the risk that the government will abuse its power by
attaching strings strategically, striking lopsided deals and gradually eroding
constitutional protections.”194 But these cases are outliers. In the end, if the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not widely recognized as applicable to
conditions imposing surveillance on the nonincarcerated, then there seems to
be literally no limit to the state wielding consent to justify any surveillance
measure.195
Whatever doctrinal label one chooses—an unconstitutional condition, an
unduly coercive “contract of adhesion,” or simply “involuntary”—electronic
surveillance conditions should not be treated as a freely made choice simply
because they are technically a condition on an offer of a nonprison sentence.
C.

Should Privacy Be Subject To Bargaining?

It may also be that electronic surveillance should not be a bargaining chip
to begin with. If one agrees with the premises underlying Carpenter, Riley, and
189. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 157 (noting the difficulty in assessing whether a defendant
would have been placed on a monitor if “EM technology were not available”).
190. See Antoine McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
209, 237–38 (2007) (arguing that people on probation and parole gain little benefit from agreeing to a
general physical search condition).
191. Doherty, supra note 39, at 340.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2006); State v. Baldon, 829
N.W.2d 785, 802 (Iowa 2013).
193. Scott, 450 F.3d at 866.
194. Id.
195. See generally Kate Weisburd, Concerning Consent and Contracts: A Criminal Procedure
Paradox (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the broad reach of the state in
justifying surveillance).
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the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, then electronic
surveillance might be viewed as so unprecedented and invasive that to offer it
up as something to be bargained away would be unconscionable.196 While
limited surveillance in some particular subset of serious crimes might be
appropriate, some may characterize a bargain that contracts away one’s right to
be free of broad invasive surveillance of everyday communication as
unconscionable.
The problem of forcing people to choose between privacy and everyday
cell phone use was one of the key factors in the Court’s decision to limit the
third-party doctrine in Carpenter. Chief Justice Roberts, in writing for the
majority, focused on the pervasiveness of cell phones to conclude that there is
no voluntary disclosure in a “meaningful sense” because cell phone use is so
widespread and “there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location
data.”197 This concern with the lack of meaningful “choice” adds credence to the
argument that perhaps privacy in one’s cell phone and own movements is not
something that should be up for bargaining.198
In both the commercial and criminal contexts, asymmetries abound
“between data collectors and the individuals whose personal information is
collected.”199 When it comes to making a decision about sharing personal data,
“people often favor immediate benefits even when there may be future
determents . . . . [P]rivacy is an issue of long-term information management,
while most decisions to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of data are
tied to a short-term benefit.”200 The problem of short-term gain in exchange for
potential long-term pain is analogous to defendants agreeing to invasive search
conditions as a way to avoid a prison sentence.
These concerns have led privacy scholars to suggest ways of limiting the
alienability of privacy rights while not completely eliminating the ability to
bargain.201 These solutions include codifying basic privacy norms; invoking
contract principles, such as default rules; establishing the right to exit; and
creating institutions to monitor privacy violations.202 It is not entirely clear how
these solutions could map onto criminal justice bargaining, where defendants
196. See Roth, Spit and Acquit, supra note 168, at 444–46 (suggesting that DNA collection as a
condition of a lenient sentence may raise bioethical concerns above and beyond traditional
voluntariness concerns).
197. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
198. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there are contract-based arguments to be made about
the legality of “bargaining” over Fourth Amendment privacy. See Wayne A. Logan & Jake Linford,
Contracting for Fourth Amendment Privacy Online, 104 MINN. L. REV. 101, 130 (2019).
199. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 2080.
200. Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 156, at 1891.
201. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2000);
Schwartz, supra note 174, at 2106; Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 156, at 1903.
202. Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 382 (2003); Schwartz,
supra note 174, at 2106; Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 156, at 1903.
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often have very little bargaining power to secure the most favorable outcome.
While comprehensively applying the principles of property and privacy law to
criminal justice bargaining is beyond the scope of this Article, much can be
learned from examining the degree to which certain rights are considered
alienable.
III. “REASONABLE” SURVEILLANCE SENTENCES
Along with the rise of consent as a justification, the emergence of the
general reasonableness standard reflects a trend toward state surveillance
untethered from meaningful Fourth Amendment protections. This part
explores the erosion of the special needs doctrine and how it has been replaced
with the general reasonableness test. I then explain why this development is
doctrinally unsound. Finally, I argue that, even under the ill-construed
reasonableness test, electronic surveillance should be more often construed as
unreasonable.
A.

The Evolution of “Reasonable” Community Supervision Searches

The emergence of the general “reasonableness” justification for electronic
surveillance reflects a significant shift in Fourth Amendment law that
reverberates well beyond the situations at issue in Knights and Samson—the two
cases that first articulated the reasonableness standard. As discussed in Part I,
warrantless probation searches were initially justified under the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement.203 Yet, most courts today do not invoke
the special needs doctrine, and the last time the Supreme Court relied on the
special needs doctrine in the context of community supervision was in 1987.204
So, why did the Court abandon the special needs exception as the justification
for probation and parole searches?
There is a two-part explanation for why the Supreme Court may have
made such a sharp turn from special needs to reasonableness in justifying
routine probation and parole searches. First, and perhaps most obvious, the
searches in both Knights and Samson were carried out by law enforcement
officers for purposes of crime solving, and, thus, it would have been
disingenuous to label either search as being carried out as part of the probation
or parole institution. Indeed, the government in Knights did not even argue that
the search was justified on special needs grounds. From reviewing the pleadings
and oral argument, it appears that the parties, as well as the Court, may have
assumed that the special needs doctrine was beside the point precisely because

203. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).
204. Id.
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of the law-enforcement nature of the search.205 This conclusion makes sense as
the special needs exception does not apply when “the immediate objective” of
the search is “to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes,” even if the
“ultimate goal” is to further a goal other than general crime control.206 What
remains a puzzle is why the inquiry did not end there. If the searches in Knights
and Samson were clearly for law enforcement purposes, why didn’t the Court
simply conclude that they were “per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment”?207
The second part of the explanation may provide an answer: the shift to
reasonableness was both piecemeal and, according to some scholars, doctrinally
incoherent.208 In Knights, although the Court invoked a general reasonableness
standard, the search was supported by reasonable suspicion and, therefore, the
Court was not staking out dramatically new doctrinal territory. And in Samson,
decided five years later, there was no suspicion to support the warrantless
search, but the Court highlighted the unique status of parolees as having less
liberty than those on probation. Although both holdings were intended to be
limited (Samson was limited to parolees, and Knights was limited because there
was reasonable suspicion in that case),209 together the cases are applied much
more broadly. Today, most lower courts reviewing various forms of electronic
surveillance do so on the Samson/Knights reasonableness test.210
The emergence of a general reasonableness test is part of what Professor
David Sklansky calls the Court’s “new Fourth Amendment originalism,” which
focuses on what was considered unreasonable at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.211 The Court’s focus on reasonableness is also in
accord with scholars, such as Akhil Reed Amar, who posit that the Fourth
Amendment does not require warrants; on the contrary, the Framers were

205. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No.
00-1260) (showing no argument of the special needs doctrine).
206. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84, 87 (2001).
207. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
208. See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 289
(2011).
209. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846–47 (2006) (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 120).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 412 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding GPS monitoring
of a parolee reasonable); United States v. Pacheco, 884 F.3d 1031, 1041 (10th Cir. 2018) (upholding
suspicionless search of cellphone of person on probation), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018); Belleau v.
Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); State v. Lietzau, 439 P.3d 839, 845 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2019) (same); State v. Phillips, 266 So. 3d 873, 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (same), rev. denied, No.
SC19-619, 2019 WL 2265037 (Fla. May 28, 2019); People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811, 826 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2015), rev’d, 876 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. 2016) (finding GPS monitoring reasonable).
211. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744
(2000).
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skeptical of general warrants.212 Instead, Amar argues, the Fourth Amendment’s
chief concern is that searches be reasonable.213
What does Samson mean for the future of warrantless searches and, in
particular, electronic surveillance of people in the criminal legal system? As
Cynthia Lee has observed, the “Court today stands at a crossroads” between
adherence to the warrant requirement on the one hand and embracing a pure
reasonableness standard on the other.214 While many jurists and scholars have
challenged Amar’s view of the Fourth Amendment, these critiques have not yet
been applied in the context of electronic surveillance of people on community
supervision; that is the topic I turn to next.
B.

Problematizing the “Reasonableness” of Surveillance Sentences

Electronic surveillance, in particular, reveals the degree to which the
general reasonableness standard allows for “unbridled discretion”215 that has no
natural limit. As pointed out by the dissent, Samson marked the first and only
time the Supreme Court has upheld “an entirely suspicionless search
unsupported by any special need.”216 Scholars have likewise noted that Samson
removed any protection against “discretionary and suspicionless searches” of
any subpopulation with reduced privacy rights.217
Electronic surveillance reveals two additional and underappreciated
concerns with the reasonableness standard. First, the reasonableness balancing
test is “very deferential to the government, and the resulting searches are almost
always deemed reasonable.”218 As Professors Barry Friedman and Cynthia
Benin Stein have argued, “The Court’s idea of ‘balancing’ is illusory—the test
is rigged such that the government almost always wins.”219 This is especially
true when it comes to people on probation and parole: the government’s stated
interest in preventing recidivism and protecting the community will almost
always trump the privacy interest of people on community supervision—a
group of people who already have diminished rights.220 As Professor Carol
Steiker has pointed out, evaluating a search on general reasonableness grounds
slides “very easily into the familiar constitutional rubric of ‘rational basis’
212. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994).
213. Id.
214. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis,
81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1136 (2012).
215. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856 (2006).
216. Id. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Primus, supra note 208, at 289; see also Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994).
218. Primus, supra note 208, at 256–57.
219. Friedman & Stein, supra note 128, at 297.
220. Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson & Gregory Barr, The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 887, 907 (2014).
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review—a level of scrutiny that has proven to be effectively no scrutiny at all.”221
As a result, the reasonableness test “is a poor approach for protecting a
constitutional right.”222
This deference to government interests explains why, in post-Samson
probation and parole search cases, the searches are almost universally upheld as
“reasonable.”223 It is challenging to argue that “‘monumental’ interests of law
enforcement”224 do not outweigh the already diminished privacy rights of
people on community supervision. For example, courts post-Samson have
upheld suspicionless DNA profiling of people on probation and parole as being
reasonable, precisely because of the strong government interests in solving
crime.225 As one judge cautioned in a dissent in one such case, by relying only on
a reasonableness standard to justify suspicionless law enforcement searches, the
Fourth Amendment becomes “little more than an afterthought as the
government seeks to conduct more and more invasive general programs in the
name of law enforcement.”226
The second problem with the test is that when it comes to electronic
surveillance, reasonableness is a “boundless” standard.227 In writing for the
majority in Samson, Justice Thomas emphasized that California law forbidding
“arbitrary, capricious or harassing” searches guarded against searches conducted
“at the unchecked ‘whim’ of law enforcement.”228 And yet, the nature of
expansive electronic surveillance of people on probation and parole is, in many
ways, arbitrary and harassing.229 Unlike physical searches, electronic
surveillance is invisible and people do not know when they are being searched
or watched. Electronic surveillance also monitors not just those in the criminal
legal system but everyone with whom they communicate or associate.230 And as
discussed below, electronic monitoring allows for the perfect surveillance of
inevitable imperfections with the many rules governing community
supervision.231 Monitoring tracks not just compliance with the technical terms
221. Steiker, supra note 217, at 855; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (arguing that the Framers intended for warrants to
curb police power).
222. Primus, supra note 208, at 297.
223. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 001260) and accompanying text.
224. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
225. See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007); Banks v. United States, 490
F.3d 1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007); United States
v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924–25 (8th Cir. 2006).
226. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 865 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 866.
228. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856 (2006).
229. For additional discussion on the harassing nature of electronic surveillance, see infra Section
III.C.
230. See infra Section III.C.
231. See infra Section III.C.2.
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of release, it collects and stores a perfect digital trail—capturing data on people’s
location that arguably has nothing to do with probation or parole. In these ways,
electronic surveillance reflects a form of “arbitrary, capricious or harassing”
searches that are nonetheless justified as “reasonable.”232
The “opaque”233 and “malleable”234 nature of the reasonableness standard
also offers little in terms of consistency or guidance to lower courts.235 This lack
of guidance may explain why two lower courts came out differently on a nearly
identical question: whether continuous GPS monitoring of parolees is
reasonable. Although the Supreme Court recently found in Grady v. North
Carolina236 that lifetime GPS monitoring constituted a search, it remanded the
case on the question of whether the search was reasonable.237 On remand, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina found that GPS monitoring was not
reasonable because of the “State’s inability to produce evidence of the efficacy
of the lifetime [monitoring] program in advancing any of its asserted legitimate
State interests.”238 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit upheld GPS monitoring as
reasonable because of the strong law enforcement interests.239 Perhaps the
difference in case outcomes can be explained by the difference in facts, but it is
also the case that a general reasonableness test lends itself to being applied
inconsistently across jurisdictions. As Cynthia Lee points out, the lack of
guidance is surprising given that “on numerous occasions the Court has spoken
of the importance of having bright line rules.”240
C.

Applying Reasonableness

The above critiques notwithstanding, even under a general reasonableness
test, courts should more often rule that blanket use of electronic search
conditions and electronic monitoring is unreasonable. This section makes the
case that Jones, Riley, and Carpenter should force a recalibration of evaluating the
reasonableness of electronic surveillance of people on community supervision.
Considering what is now known (and not known) about the capacity of digital
surveillance, which is beyond what was possible with the physical searches at
issue in Samson, the balance between government interests versus privacy
intrusions now tips in favor of greater privacy protection.
232. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
233. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 844 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Lee, supra note 214, at 1149.
236. 575 U.S. 306 (2015).
237. Id. at 309–10.
238. State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 831 S.E.2d 542, 567 (2019); see also Commonwealth v. Feliz,
119 N.E.3d 700, 692–93 (Mass. 2019) (concluding that GPS monitoring as a condition of probation is
unreasonable).
239. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2016).
240. Lee, supra note 214, at 1149.
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1. Significant Privacy Intrusion
One of the most common factors in evaluating the reasonableness of
probation and parole searches, including electronic surveillance, is the fact that
people on community supervision have a “significantly diminish[ed]”
reasonable expectation of privacy.241 And yet, as any criminal procedure student
knows, this logic is circular: People’s expectations of privacy depend on
expectations set, at least to some degree, by the government. As the late William
Stuntz observed, “[B]y altering its behavior, the government can change how
people expect it to behave. Thus, if the government is bound only to respect
people’s expectations, it is not bound at all, for it can easily condition the
citizenry to expect little or no privacy.”242 This is especially true in the context
of probation and parole, where the expectation of privacy is dictated by the
official imposing the search condition or the GPS device. As Stuntz opines, the
more important question—especially in the context of surveillance—is a
normative one: What should a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy be?243
In Carpenter, the Court began to answer that normative question: People
should, in fact, enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital trail.244
And yet, as noted in Part I, this change in the Court’s conception of expectations
of privacy has not been extended to those on probation and parole. But it should
be.
a.

Privacy as Refuge

As other scholars have observed, invasive electronic surveillance
exemplifies Jeremy Bentham’s vision of the modern panopticon in which the
“fear of being watched inhibits transgression.”245 Indeed, the “‘panoptic gaze’ of
constant government surveillance is arguably the most dangerous threat to
personhood and citizenship” in modern life.246 Continuous electronic
surveillance of one’s movements, as well as data and communications, however,
takes the panopticon one step further: the government is not just watching or
threatening to watch but is actually “analyzing and drawing connections
241. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001).
242. Stuntz, The Distribution, supra note 30, at 1268.
243. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) (“[W]here an individual’s subjective
expectations ha[ve] been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection [is].”); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(d) (5th ed. 2012) (“[W]hat is involved
here is ‘our societal understanding’ regarding what deserves ‘protection from government invasion.’”
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984))).
244. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
245. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264,
1267 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law].
246. Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 493 (2014).
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between data.”247 As Professor Daniel Solove has observed of the mosaic theory,
“[L]ittle bits of innocuous data can say a lot in combination.”248
Electronic surveillance of people on community supervision is an
unprecedented blow to privacy of the nonincarcerated. With respect to
electronic searches, much of our private lives is lived online and smartphones
create a record of everything. Cell phone use, as well as the amount of data
stored on them, has risen dramatically. Cellphone ownership is no longer
limited to the wealthy; cell phones are now used by over ninety percent of
adults.249 For example, most Americans do their banking and manage health
records online.250 As the Riley Court observed, cell phones are “now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”251
These privacy concerns apply equally to GPS-equipped ankle monitors.
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor cautioned against the extensive
use of GPS surveillance because “it generates a precise, comprehensive record
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”252 This, in turns, alters
“the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”253
The nature of electronic surveillance, as compared to physical searches,
also demonstrates the uniquely invasive quality of electronic searches.254 In the
Riley Court’s words, “Before cellphones, a search of a person was limited by
physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow
intrusion on privacy.”255 With respect to a typical probation search of a house, or
a drug test that is a condition of probation, a defendant knows when he is being
searched, tested, or monitored. And because it is a physical impossibility for law
enforcement to constantly conduct physical searches or follow someone around

247. Balkin, supra note 38, at 12.
248. Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note 156, at 1890; see also Kerr, The Mosaic Theory, supra
note 38, at 311 (noting that courts appropriately view continuous collection of small bits of modern
data as an “aggregate whole”).
249. Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/
[https://perma.cc/J456-E3VN].
250. Susannah Fox, 51% of Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/ [https://perma.cc/
X6SE-BE69].
251. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
252. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 416.
254. See Joh, Policing by Numbers, supra note 90 (“Not only is the quantity of information collected
in the big data context far greater, the very nature of surveillance itself is different.”).
255. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
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twenty-four hours a day, a natural limit exists on the amount of searching that
occurs.
Electronic surveillance, in contrast, allows law enforcement, with the click
of a mouse, to access immense amounts of personal, otherwise private,
information at any time of day and without notice to the defendant.256 The
search of a cell phone “would typically expose to the government far more than
the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form
many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad
array of private information never found in a home in any form.”257 Texts to
family, emails to friends, political posts on social media, and confidential
communication with doctors, for example, are all viewable at all times. And
unlike a physical search of a home, GPS-equipped electronic monitoring means
that people’s movement “will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”258 In short, “[r]ather than a targeted
query for information,” electronic surveillance “is often akin to casting a giant
net, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond that which was
originally sought.”259
While Jones, Riley, and Carpenter focused on the rights of suspects, nothing
about the Court’s discussion of the unique attributes of cell phones or GPS
tracking devices rested on the special status of arrestees. Instead, the privacy
costs articulated by the Court apply equally to any user of personal electronic
devices or any person forced to wear an electronic monitor. Regardless of the
owner’s status as a suspect, arrestee, probationer, or parolee, cell phones and
electronic monitors are rich with private information about nearly all aspects of
life.
The electronic privacy concerns for people on probation and parole are
also heightened because they are already, for the most part, subject to probation
conditions that allow for unannounced warrantless searches of their home,
property, and person.260 By virtue of being on probation or parole, they already
live their lives under a microscope. Electronic surveillance means that people
on probation or parole have little remaining sectors of their lives shielded from
the government’s view.
Being on a GPS ankle monitor also triggers significant dignity costs. Many
people who have been on an electronic monitor describe it as a “shackle” that is

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1269.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1269.
Doherty, supra note 39, at 317–18 (discussing the frequency of probation searches).
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suffocating.261 Federal District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein referred to
electronic monitoring as tracking a person as if he “were a feral animal.”262 As
long as GPS devices remain the size they currently are, they also act as a “scarlet
letter,” which, as one judge observed, “will undoubtedly cause panic, assaults,
harassment, and humiliation.”263 Clothes do not completely hide the devices,
“especially given the need to regularly recharge and maintain the device’s GPS
connection.”264 One young person on a monitor complained that the device
buzzed in class, prompting his teacher to ask him why he was wearing the
monitor.265 Another young person was turned away from a charter school when
the principal saw the GPS monitor on his ankle.266 And people on monitors
report that potential employers see the monitor and tell them to reapply once
the monitor is removed.267
The privacy implications are significant not just for people on probation
and parole but for everyone with whom they communicate and associate.268 It
is well documented that “permissive parole search jurisprudence” leads to more
searches of parolees’ nonparolee neighbors, which means that entire neighborhoods
have dramatically lessened Fourth Amendment rights.269 In many jurisdictions,
police accompany probation officers doing probation searches precisely because
the ability to search is so much greater in the probation context.270
Electronic surveillance amplifies the privacy intrusions for third parties.
The search of a cell phone reveals potentially incriminating statements by the
person subject to the search and by anyone with whom they communicate. Such
a search is a powerful tool in a police officer’s toolbelt: more likely than not,
more than one person may make incriminating statements that are then
recorded on multiple phones. Similarly, electronic monitoring implicates not
just the person wearing the device but the other people with whom they
associate or visit with. As one woman who spent time on a monitor explained,
the “people who have not done anything are constantly being incarcerated with
261. James Kilgore, “You’re Still in Jail”: How Electronic Monitoring Is a Shackle on the Movement for
Decarceration, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 22, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/you-re-still-in-jail-howelectronic-monitoring-is-a-shackle-on-the-movement-for-decarceration/
[https://perma.cc/T52YQF4M] [hereinafter Kilgore, You’re Still in Jail].
262. United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
263. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1012 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
264. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 20, Michigan v. Cole, 817 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2012) (No. 143046), 2012 WL 697464.
265. Lerner, supra note 53.
266. Telephone Interview with Laurel Arroyo, Juvenile Pub. Def., Alameda Cty. (June 15, 2018).
267. Kilgore, You’re Still in Jail, supra note 261.
268. See Jacobi et al., supra note 220, at 908 (“Parole not only reduces the Fourth Amendment
rights of individual parolees, but also it erodes the constitutional protections of anyone the parolee
happens to live with.”).
269. Id. at 888.
270. See Doherty, supra note 39, at 322.
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the person [wearing the monitor]. Whoever lives in that house is being policed
in that jail.”271 Thus, courts and scholars should acknowledge the collateral
damage to others’ privacy from broad electronic surveillance of supervisees.
Some might argue that those on community supervision are not akin to
the arrestees and suspects in Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, given that people on
probation and parole have been convicted of crimes and suspects are still
presumed innocent. However, this difference, without more, cannot logically
justify a dramatically different level of Fourth Amendment protections. In fact,
a suspect for whom police have probable cause to believe committed a crime
should arguably have fewer privacy rights than a probationer or parolee who has
been restored to the normalcy of living and working in the community and
suspected of no new wrongdoing and is not in a custody situation where the
search is necessary for officer safety.
b.

Discouraging Dissent

Warrantless government surveillance of people on community supervision
risks chilling speech, as well as freedom of association and movement. Constant
monitoring of one’s digital life and communications constitutes what Neil
Richards has termed “intellectual surveillance,” a species of monitoring that is
“especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new,
controversial, or deviant ideas.”272 Because supervisees know they are being
potentially searched at all times,273 electronic surveillance—more than physical
surveillance—“shapes and restricts behavior.”274 And because the courage to
dissent is often a challenge, “[d]issent’s fragile lifecycle—from formulation to
ferment—requires privacy and often confidential association to flourish.”275
Moreover, while monitoring by commercial entities is one thing, monitoring by
the state of a supervisee, who already understands he is one step away from
incarceration upon revocation, might presumably have an even more dramatic
dampening effect on would-be dissent.
By further stripping those on community supervision of personal agency
and voice, constant surveillance arguably hastens the “civil death” associated
with criminal convictions.276 To be this closely watched and, by extension,
limited in what you say or do, is part of the “degradation ceremony”277 associated
271. Kilgore, You’re Still in Jail, supra note 261.
272. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
273. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1269–70.
274. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2017).
275. Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment To Do the Work of the First?, 127 YALE L.J.F.
444, 444 (2017).
276. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012).
277. Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420, 420
(1956).
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with a criminal conviction. This intellectual surveillance may also contribute to
what Monica Bell has termed “legal estrangement,” in which communities of
color experience detachment and alienation from the state, and ultimately
exclusion from the legal protections of society.278
Ultimately, government monitoring of speech and movement jeopardizes
democracy and political discourse by discouraging free flow of ideas and, in
particular, dissent.279 Those being watched cannot as meaningfully participate
in the “vast democratic forums of the [i]nternet,”280 or really any form of
democracy.281 Thus, “the worth of information privacy accrues” not only to the
individual but ultimately to society.282 Taken to extremes, the stifling of dissent
through surveillance can eventually sound the death knell for a democracy; in
Justice Brennan’s phrasing, surveillance “makes the police omniscient; and
police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.”283
To the extent that misdemeanor practice and community supervision of
low-risk defendants are modern means of managing certain populations,284 the
stifling of dissent in this subpopulation is particularly concerning.285 Many
people on community supervision already have criminal records that,
depending on the jurisdiction, preclude them from exercising their political
voice through alternative means such as voting and jury service. Over six
million Americans are currently disenfranchised because of a criminal record.286
Roughly thirty percent of African American men are prohibited from jury
service because of a criminal record.287 Thus, it is precisely this population that
may have the most to lose from the inability to speak freely and criticize the
very government apparatus that arrested, charged, prosecuted, and now
surveilles them.
278. See Monica Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054,
2054 (2017).
279. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance, supra note 245, at 1268.
280. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
281. See AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 231–32 (2014) (discussing how
criminal convictions recast the relationship between citizen and state, resulting in a growing secondclass citizenship).
282. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 2087.
283. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284. See generally Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (2014) (theorizing misdemeanor courts as sites of social control).
285. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(describing historical examples of abusive government surveillance of political radicals and minorities).
286. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A
PRIMER
1
(2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FelonyDisenfranchisement-Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8TM-UDJ5].
287. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGEL, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 2:4 (2018).
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Racialized Intrusions

Because of the rehabilitative and probation-as-privilege rhetoric
surrounding community supervision, the racial inequity reinforced by
electronic surveillance may be more insidious than the inequity of mass
incarceration, which has been more thoroughly documented.288 And yet, as a
community activist J. Jhondi Harrell explains, an ankle monitor invokes the
“sign of an old slave shackle” and a “throw-back to slavery.”289 In many ways,
electronic searches and surveillance are another method of social control that,
by design, exert supervision over portions of the population deemed in need of
“correction.”290 In Jonathan Simon’s words, the “othering” of people in the
criminal legal system is historically racialized,291 and warrantless electronic
surveillance represents another method of controlling the “other.”
As with virtually every aspect of the criminal legal system, invasive
electronic surveillance of supervisees disproportionally impacts communities of
color.292 In some neighborhoods, more than half of Black men are under
correctional control, many on some form of probation or parole.293 The history
of surveillance is likewise racialized. From the FBI monitoring leaders of the
Civil Rights Movement to the surveillance of Movement for Black Lives,
“people of color have been the disproportionate victims of unjust
surveillance.”294 The parallels between surveillance today and slavery are ever
apparent, as “[m]onitoring the movement of slaves was a central concern for
plantation masters and slave patrollers.”295 As activist and monitoring expert
James Kilgore explains, “[T]he data points of a GPS map are the modern
288. See Malkia Amala Cyril, Black America’s State of Surveillance, PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://progressive.org/magazine/black-america-s-state-surveillance-cyril/
[https://perma.cc/J7LEADL4] (“As surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement . . .
racial disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to tell the story of
surveillance in the context of structural racism.”).
289. The Voices of the Monitored-Video and Audio Gallery, CHALLENGING E-CARCERATION
(Mar. 24, 2018), www.challengingecarceration.org/watch-videos/ [https://perma.cc/WV8F-CNSW]
(audio recording of J. Jhondi Harrell).
290. See VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS, at xiv
(2011) (describing the “youth control complex,” a system of constant surveillance in which every day
youthful behavior is viewed as potentially criminal).
291. Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar
Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1625, 1628
(2017).
292. See FERGUSON, supra note 29, at 133–34; Kirstie Ball, MariaLaura Di Domenico & Daniel
Nunan, Big Data Surveillance and the Body-Subject, 22 BODY & SOC’Y 58, 70–71 (2016).
293. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLOR BLINDNESS 9 (rev. ed. 2012); see also Capers, supra note 28, at 1288.
294. Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-says-aboutmodern-spying.html [https://perma.cc/RG8L-CTJ2].
295. Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Police Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary
Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 156 (2001).
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equivalent of ‘lanterns law’ that forced Black and Indigenous people in New
York to carry candles if they travelled after dark—only the lights of data points
never really go out.”296 In these ways, electronic surveillance represents one of
the newest forms of crime management and social control.297 Such searches
allow for “aggregate control and system management” not just of individuals
but of entire groups and subpopulations.298
Surveillance in the criminal legal system has always been, at least to some
degree, racialized. The concept of needing to monitor so as to enable reentry
assumes an “unruly” group that requires correction. This same “rabble
management” approach299 gave rise to the “broken windows” theory of crimecontrol,300 as well as aggressive police tactics like stop-and-frisk and using
misdemeanors as a form of social control.301 These practices were ostensibly race
neutral, and some argued that these policies benefited communities of color, but
the reality, as observed by scholars, was that these policies had the opposite
impact.302 Instead of solving crime and aiding in rehabilitation, these searchand-apprehend approaches of crime control inflict a form of state-sanctioned
violence on communities of color, further subordinating and disenfranchising
historically oppressed groups.
The ways in which electronic surveillance chills speech and association
might also be viewed as a form of racialized degradation.303 As Professors Devon
Carbado and Mitu Gulati point out in their book, Acting White?, “as a matter of
both socialization and formal or informal political advice, African Americans
are encouraged to signal cooperation by giving up their privacy” when
confronted by law enforcement.304 In this way, warrantless electronic searches
are not just about the loss of control over private information but also the ways

296. James Kilgore, Opinion, The First Step Act Opens the Door to Digital Incarceration, TRUTHOUT
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://truthout.org/articles/the-first-step-act-opens-the-door-to-digitalincarceration/ [https://perma.cc/92DB-NETR].
297. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 6, 17 (2001).
298. Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 (1992).
299. See generally JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (2013) (coining the phrase “rabble management”).
300. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE
OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001) (challenging the “broken windows” theory of punishment
in which minor misdemeanors need to be punished in order to prevent more serious crimes).
301. See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 284, at 614.
302. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 194 (2018).
303. See Arnett, supra note 37 (explaining that electronic monitoring reflects the “maintenance of
social stratification”).
304. DEVON CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POSTRACIAL” AMERICA 102 (2013).
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that these searches “can build habits of dehumanization and brutality in the
institutions and officials carrying” them out.305
It is worth asking whether the solution may be a more egalitarian
distribution of diminished privacy rights—“equitable surveillance”306—across
all racial groups, an extension of the “all of us or none of us” position recently
articulated by several scholars.307 This solution might look like more people, not
less, being subject to electronic search conditions and surveillance. Professor
Bennett Capers, for example, makes a compelling argument that expanding
“soft” police surveillance techniques308—such as public surveillance cameras and
more terahertz scanners—would help deracialize policing because this
technology is not prone to implicit bias or unconscious racism.309 It is less
obvious if this reasoning holds true when the surveillance technology is more
invasive, less “soft,” and depends on law enforcement to implement, enforce,
and interpret.
2. Limited Government Interests
Having revealed the significant privacy interests at stake, I turn next to
the purported government interests in electronic surveillance of people on
community supervision. The most commonly stated government interests are
rehabilitation and reducing recidivism. And yet, as a threshold matter, there is
virtually no empirical evidence that electronic surveillance furthers these
goals—if anything, there are reasons to believe that surveillance undermines
these otherwise noble goals.
a.

Undermines Rehabilitation

Expansive and invasive electronic surveillance is part of an overall regime
shift in community supervision that prioritizes automated, hypertechnical
surveillance over more individualized and, in theory, rehabilitative
approaches.310 While scholars have theorized about the ways that community
supervision results in net widening and undermines, rather than promotes,

305. David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think About Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1105 (2014) [hereinafter Sklansky, Too Much Information].
306. Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1304 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial by
Machine].
307. See Capers, supra note 28, at 1273; Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization
and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 873 (2011) (noting potential salutary effects of
randomized searches and surveillance on racial disparities in policing).
308. Capers, supra note 28, at 1244.
309. Id. at 1276.
310. See GARLAND, supra note 297, at 168–70; JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE
AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990, at 241–43 (1993); Kohler-Hausmann,
supra note 284, at 688–89; Michelle Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a More Robust Theory of State
Variation in Punishment, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 53, 55–56 (2016).
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successful societal reentry,311 these concerns are amplified when electronic
surveillance becomes a convenient, omniscient, and perpetual means to monitor
strict compliance with probation and parole terms.
To fully appreciate the impact of electronic surveillance on the efficacy of
probation as a penal intervention, one should bear in mind three fundamental
features of the modern probation and parole system. First, probation and parole
departments are historically underfunded and have increasingly high
caseloads.312 As previously noted, while the number of people on some form of
community supervision has dramatically increased, the number of probation
and parole officers has not.313 Probation and parole departments are being
required to do more with less.
Second, at the same time, the number of conditions of probation and
parole has significantly increased.314 Those on community supervision are now
ordered to comply with dozens of rules as standard practice, some very detailed
and some very broad.315 Standard conditions include regularly reporting for
probation office visits, notifying officers of address or job changes, not
associating with people who have been convicted of felonies, not using or
possessing alcohol or drugs, working regularly or attending school, paying
probation fees and fines, supporting dependents, not leaving the state or county
without permission from probation, abiding by curfew, obeying orders to “stay
away” from certain people or places, providing DNA samples, and participating
in certain drug and alcohol treatments.316 While any one condition may seem
reasonable, the cumulative effect “imposes a nearly impossible burden.”317 At
any point, anyone on probation could be out of compliance with some of the
conditions that prohibit both criminal and noncriminal behavior.318
311. Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 144; Feeley & Simon, supra note 298, at 455–57; Eisha Jain,
Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1208 (2016); Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation
from Micro to Macro: Tracing the Expansion and Consequences of Community Supervision, 3 ANN. REV.
CRIMINOLOGY 261, 262 (2020); cf. Jay-Z, Opinion, Jay-Z: The Criminal Justice System Stalks Black People
like Meek Mill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/opinion/jay-z-meekmill-probation.html [https://perma.cc/W7AN-EKX8 (dark archive)] (describing how instead of being
a “second chance, probation ends up being a land mine, with a random misstep bringing consequences
greater than the crime”); Phelps, The Paradox of Probation, supra note 39, at 53.
312. MICHAEL P. JACOBSON ET AL., HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., LESS IS MORE: HOW
REDUCING
PROBATION
POPULATIONS
CAN
IMPROVE
OUTCOMES
6
(2017),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/less_is_more_final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MP7J-7V6D].
313. See id.
314. Ronald P. Corbett, Jr., The Burdens of Leniency: The Changing Face of Probation, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 1697, 1708 (2015).
315. Id. at 1710.
316. See Doherty, supra note 39, at 303–14.
317. Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1035 (2013).
318. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 310, at 11–12; Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing, supra note 79, at 75.
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Additional rules are imposed for people ordered to wear monitors. In
many jurisdictions, people on electronic monitors are subject to house arrest
and may need permission from their probation or parole officer before leaving
their house or changing their schedule.319 Other jurisdictions require that people
on monitors obtain permission before changing employment, “required
treatment,” and/or residence; that they maintain a working landline; and that
they regularly charge their monitoring device.320 The sheer number of distinct
rules is also notable. In Alaska, St. Louis, and Seattle, for example, people on
electronic monitoring are subject to over thirty separate rules governing
electronic monitoring.321
Third, many probation terms are so broadly or vaguely worded that what
constitutes a violation is highly discretionary. For example, as Professor Fiona
Doherty discovered, the jurisdictions with the largest probation populations—
Georgia, Texas, and California—all have broad “good conduct” terms that
include “[b]e of [g]eneral [g]ood [b]ehavior,” do not “become abandoned to a
vicious life” and “[a]void injurious and/or vicious habits.”322 In addition to the
general “be good” terms, several states prohibit people on probation from
spending time with “persons having known criminal records” and require them
to either work full time or be in school.323 These terms are sufficiently broad
that any range of everyday noncriminal conduct could be construed as a
violation. Whether certain conduct triggers a formal violation is left to the

319. See, e.g., STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, COR.14.22, ELECTRONIC MONITORING
SERVICE CORRECTIONAL POLICY 14.22 (Mar. 30, 2016), https://dps.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/COR.14.22.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFG-B9DW]; COURT OF COMMON
PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC MONITORING/GPS TRACKING UNIT
RULES (2019) (on file with author); IOWA DEP’T OF CORRS., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AND
EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT RULES (2017) (on file with author); KING CTY. DEP’T OF ADULT &
JUVENILE DET., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS-ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION
(EHD) (on file with author); ORANGE CTY. PROB. DEP’T, TERMS & CONDITIONS FOR
CONTINUOUS ELECTRONIC MONITORING SUPERVISION VIA GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
(GPS) (on file with author).
320. STATE OF HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, COR 14.22, ELECTRONIC MONITORING
SERVICE
CORRECTIONAL
POLICY
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://dps.hawaii.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/COR.14.22.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFG-B9DW]; BUREAU OF CMTY.
CORRS., DEL., DEP’T OF CORR., CONDITIONS OF ADDENDUM FOR GPS PROGRAM (2016) (on file
with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY., ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION
CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); KING CTY. WASH., DEP’T OF ADULT & JUVENILE
DET., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS-ELECTRONIC HOME DETENTION (EHD) (on file
with author).
321. See ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., FORM 903.06B, ELECTRONIC MONITORING TERMS &
CONDITIONS (2017) (on file with author); DEP’T OF JUSTICE SERVS., ST. LOUIS CTY., ELECTRONIC
HOME DETENTION CONTRACT/AGREEMENT (on file with author); KING CTY., WASH., DEP’T OF
ADULT & JUVENILE DET., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS-ELECTRONIC HOME
DETENTION (EHD) (on file with author).
322. Doherty, supra note 39, at 303, 305 (internal quotations omitted).
323. Id. at 308; see Jacobi et. al., supra note 220, at 938.
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discretion of individual probation officers with little guidance; and these
“‘street-level’ discretionary decisions” often go unscrutinized.324
Taken together, these features reveal a regime primed to prioritize
supervision techniques that favor technical compliance over time-intensive
human interaction. High caseloads and limited budgets, coupled with the
discretion afforded to probation officers to document violations of increasingly
harsh terms, have given rise to a new type of hypercompliance.325
In the context of hypercompliance, electronic surveillance allows for
perfect detection of inevitable imperfections. This type of surveillance is
arguably analogous to red-light cameras, except that the penalty is often
incarceration rather than a two hundred dollar ticket.326 In addition, unlike
regulations against running red lights, the conditions of probation are so
numerous and broadly worded that documenting a violation based on an
electronic search or a GPS monitor is presumably like shooting fish in a barrel.
As one probation expert observed: “If I have 100 percent surveillance capacity,
I’m going to find problems, and then I’m going to have to respond to them.”327
Furthermore, an “agent conducting a search or seizure no longer need to be
physically located in the same place as the target of the search or seizure.”328 As
a result, expansive electronic surveillance tends to focus attention on the
defendant’s rule compliance, obscuring or relegating to the background
deficiencies within public institutions, such as schools, probation, and parole.
Expansive electronic surveillance, with its emphasis on strict rule
compliance, exemplifies the way that the “rehabilitative functions associated
with parole have atrophied.”329 Indeed, electronic searches and monitoring are
not inherently rehabilitative in nature—they are merely tools that purport to
facilitate supervision,330 giving probation officers and police “wide latitude in
deciding how to press for compliance.”331 For example, people who have spent
time on electronic monitoring report being arrested when they failed to get
permission to leave their house to go to a last-minute doctor’s appointment or a
324. Klingele, supra note 317, at 1039.
325. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 439 (“Parole officers today spend more time monitoring
conditions than providing services. In how they carry out their jobs, parole officers look less like social
workers and more like police officers.”).
326. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 264,
267 (2016) (imagining surveillance technology that could perfectly identify and report the perpetrator
of every crime); Roth, Trial by Machine, supra note 306, at 1303 (discussing red-light cameras).
327. Sarah Childress, Todd Clear: Why America’s Mass Incarceration Experiment Failed, PBS
FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/todd-clear-why-americasmass-incarceration-experiment-failed [https://perma.cc/J7S4-KY4U].
328. Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 369–70 (2015).
329. THOMPSON, supra note 31, at 143.
330. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 144 (discussing the ways that electronic monitoring “is not
inherently rehabilitative”).
331. Doherty, supra note 39, at 313.
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job interview.332 Ultimately, when parole or probation officers focus on
managing through technical requirements, “[s]uch technocratic rationalization
tends to insulate institutions from the messy, hard-to-control demands of the
social world.”333
The expanded search power that comes along with electronic surveillance
further undermines what are often already strained relationships between
probation and parole officers and their supervisees.334 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,335
decided long before the advent of cell phones, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent,
observed the irony of using rehabilitation as the justification for removing the
warrant requirement:
I fail to see how the role of the probation agent in “foster[ing] growth
and development of the client” is enhanced the slightest bit by the ability
to conduct a search without the checks provided by prior neutral review.
If anything, the power to decide to search will prove a barrier to
establishing any degree of trust between agent and “client.”336
Justice Blackmun just as easily could have been referring to warrantless
electronic surveillance. GPS-monitoring and electronic searches send the
message to supervisees that their supervising officers are less focused on
meaningful reentry and more focused on “closely monitoring offenders to catch
them when they fail to meet all required conditions.”337 And from the officer’s
perspective, this level of “intrusive surveillance” can cause the monitoring agent
“to dehumanize and depersonalize the people they search or surveil.”338
Intensive surveillance may also chill communication that would otherwise
facilitate the rehabilitation process. People on community supervision rely on
cell phones and other electronic devices as a lifeline to reentry and
reintegration. More than ever before, it is through smart phones, computers,
and the internet that people on probation and parole connect to jobs, social
services, health care providers, education, and more. Indeed, social media and
the internet offers a “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication
of all kinds.”339 And yet, warrantless surveillance may undermine this otherwise
healthy exchange of information.
332. Kilgore, You’re Still in Jail, supra note 261.
333. Feeley & Simon, supra note 298, at 456.
334. See SIMON, supra note 310, at 78–80; Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing, supra note 79, at 761–62;
Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 439.
335. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
336. Id. at 886 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Id. at 876 (majority opinion)).
337. Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard P.
Seiter & Angela D. West, Supervision Styles in Probation and Parole: An Analysis of Activities, J.
OFFENDER REHABILITATION, Dec. 2003, at 57, 58).
338. See Sklansky, Too Much Information, supra note 305, at 1112.
339. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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Increases Recidivism

Suspicionless electronic surveillance likely contributes to greater rates of
rearrest and reincarceration, not necessarily for new criminal offenses, but for
technical rule violations.340 Although the degree to which this happens has yet
to be studied, and is beyond the scope of this Article, higher arrest rates based
on expansive electronic surveillance are an example of what scholars warn about
as a danger of piling on collateral consequences in addition to prison and jail
sentences.341 When courts place numerous probation conditions and restrictions
on low-risk defendants, the result is probation violations for minor infractions
that are often unrelated to public safety.342 These violations are rarely attributed
to the excessive “piling on” problem; instead the fault is placed on the defendant
for not taking advantage of reentry services. And violations do not impact all
people on probation and parole equally. Leading researchers have found that
non-white people on probation are subjected to higher rates of probation
revocation.343
At the same time, resource-strapped probation and parole agencies are
often ill-equipped to address violations through any consequence other than
incarceration. On the front end, there are fewer resources and staff for
meaningful and individualized support (such as treatment programs,
educational opportunities, job training or counseling). According to one
national study, for example, “over two-thirds of probationers reported using
drugs in the past; nearly a third reported use in the month before” the
conviction that lead to probation.344 And yet only seventeen percent of those
respondents received any substance abuse treatment while on probation.345
The consequence of more easily detected violations is often incarceration.
On the back end, agencies are so underfunded that they cannot “respond to
technical violations in a graduated or nuanced way.”346 Because there are so few
340. See Thomas Blomberg & Karol Lucken, Stacking the Deck by Piling up Sanctions: Is Intermediate
Punishment Destined To Fail?, 33 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 62, 68 (1994) (discussing how the “piling up of
sanctions” results in detention for violations).
341. See Chin, supra note 276, at 1790; Jain, supra note 311, at 1244; Roberts, supra note 165, at 119;
Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling on: Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2015).
342. See PEGGY BURKE, ADAM GELB & JAKE HOROWITZ, THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION
VIOLATIONS 2
(2007),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/
2007/%20when20offenders20break20the20rulespdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8JW-53BC].
343. MICHELLE S. PHELPS, Mass Probation & Inequality, in 2 HANDBOOK ON PUNISHMENT
DECISIONS 43, 49 (Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradly eds., 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
scans/phelps/mass_probation_and_inequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4H5-6W65].
344. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
TREATMENT OF ADULTS ON PROBATION, 1995, at 1 (1998), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/
scans/bjs/satap95.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FK8-SU4U].
345. Id.
346. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 6.
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resources in the community, probation and parole officers “default to the most
available option they have—the most expensive and punitive option—the formal
violation process which often results in jail or prison.”347 In this way, electronic
searches contribute to a catch-22: more is expected of people on community
supervision; noncompliance is more easily detected; and at the same time, there
are fewer resources to support those on community supervision, both to avoid
a violation in the first place and as a response to a violation. As Professor
Michelle Phelps’s research demonstrates, people on probation who have more
resources and privilege tend to fare better while “their less advantaged
counterparts are funneled deeper into the criminal justice system.”348
In short, increased surveillance capabilities may contribute to increased
recidivism rates, not for new criminal offenses but for rule violations that often
have little do to with public safety. Indeed, it is well settled that probation and
parole violations account for a large percentage of prison admissions.349 In some
states, more than one in three people in prison are there for technical
supervision violations, such as a failed drug test or failure to report to a
probation appointment.350 These violations become a gateway to months (if not
years) of cycling in and out of incarceration, reflecting a “closed circuit of
perpetual marginality.”351
c.

Lack of Outcome Evidence

There is no evidence that more surveillance effectively addresses any of
the underlying problems that may have triggered someone’s entry into the
criminal legal system. There is also no data demonstrating that greater
surveillance leads to greater public safety. If anything, most mainstream news
stories about electronic monitoring focus on people who cut off the monitor
before committing a new crime.352 Of the very few studies that do exist, some
make claims about effectiveness, but these studies are small in scale and fail to
compare outcomes between people on monitors and similarly situated groups not
on monitors.353
347. Id.
348. See PHELPS, supra note 342, at 56.
349. See Confined and Costly: How Supervision Violations Are Filling Prisons and Burdening Budgets,
COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (2020), https://csgjusticecenter.org/confinedandcostly/
[https://perma.cc/X7ZG-ZJQJ].
350. Id.
351. ALEXANDER, supra note 293, at 95.
352. See, e.g., Charlotte Man Wanted After Cutting off Electronic Monitoring Device, FOX 46
CHARLOTTE (Apr. 16, 2019), http://www.fox46charlotte.com/news/local-news/charlotte-manwanted-after-cutting-off-electronic-monitoring-device [https://perma.cc/PU8E-UX6H]; Suspect With
Multiple Breaking-and-Entering Charges on the Run After Removing Ankle Monitor, WBTV (July 27, 2019),
https://www.wbtv.com/2019/07/27/suspect-with-multiple-breaking-and-entering-charges-run-afterremoving-ankle-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/E4LK-JNKM].
353. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 176–77.
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There is, however, emerging research concluding that electronic
monitoring leads to worse outcomes.354 As two researchers from the Brookings
Institute observed, “False positive alerts overwhelm corrections officials,
‘tamper-proof’ devices can be circumvented, and technical glitches interfere
with users’ ability to hold down a job.”355 Similarly, a pilot project for
monitoring court-involved youth in New York City was plagued with technical
problems, including problems with battery life, the ability to charge the devices,
and cell phone reception in a large urban area.356 The monitoring devices also
alerted the young people through a beep that was so disruptive at school that
one participant was asked to leave class.357 A recent study by the Illinois
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council likewise found that the use of electronic
monitoring “can increase the risk of technical violations and returns to prison,
especially for low- or moderate-risk offenders.”358 People who have worn ankle
monitors also worry that the devices will malfunction or prove unreliable.359
There is also little evidence that placing more people on electronic
monitors corresponds to less crowded jails and prisons.360 In San Francisco, for
example, bail reform triggered an increase in the use of electronic monitoring,
but there was no parallel dip in the jail population.361 While other factors may
help explain this phenomenon, the data does not appear to support the
proposition that more people on electronic monitors means fewer people in jail.
Part of the reason there is so little empirical evidence is that the use of
electronic surveillance is opaque. The opacity of electronic surveillance flows
from a few sources. First, there is no meaningful oversight, much less judicial
review, of the processes that lead to electronic surveillance. For example,

354. For a critique of the few studies on electronic monitoring, see generally James Kilgore,
Electronic Monitoring: A Survey of the Research for Decarceration Activists, CHALLENING E-CARCERATION
(July 3, 2018), https://www.challengingecarceration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Survey-of-EMResearch.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A8K-NV63] (summarizing research on e-carceration and providing
arguments against it).
355. Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, Decades Later, Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Is Still Prone
to Failure, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2017/09/21/decades-later-electronic-monitoring-of-offenders-is-still-prone-to-failure/
[https://perma.cc/RT2F-ENTT].
356. See Balasubramanyam & Antoine, supra note 55, at 4, 6.
357. Id.
358. SALTMARSH, supra note 36, at 6.
359. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, supra note 264, at 20.
360. Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 172.
361. See SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE BUDGET AND FINANCE
SUBCOMMITTEE (2019) (on file with author); Anmarie Mabbut, San Francisco Needs To Have a Real
Public Dialogue About Its Electronic Monitoring Program, S.F. EXAMINER (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/san-francisco-needs-to-have-a-real-public-dialogue-about-itselectronic-monitoring-program/ [https://perma.cc/8HC2-LZ9Z].
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prosecutors and judges are provided wide latitude in plea negotiations362 and
setting terms of supervised release.363 In at least one jurisdiction, Washington,
D.C., it is often probation officers—not judges—deciding who is placed on a
monitor and for how long.364 No mechanism exists to track conditions of
probation or the specific terms of the several thousand plea agreements that are
processed in the United States each year.365
Second, it is challenging to evaluate the full impact of electronic
surveillance because implementation is left to the several thousand probation
and parole agencies throughout the United States.366 The extent to which
electronic surveillance mechanisms are relied on, and how, is the product of
thousands of administrative decisions and exemplifies how the parameters of
searches are increasingly “designed through administrative policies.”367
Third, the expansion of the criminal legal system through private industry,
rather than more transparent public decisionmaking processes, also frustrates
any effort to collect and analyze data. Relatedly, with private industry driving
reform, it is impossible to disaggregate whether it is profit motive or sound
evidence-based policy behind the expansion of criminal justice surveillance
technology.368 The advertising rhetoric (with services like PureTrack that are
touted as “community-based” alternatives369) further compound the opacity
problem. It is challenging to discern the precise service being offered or how it
is used in practice.370
In sum, the effectiveness of electronic surveillance can only be evaluated
once there are better data and a greater understanding of the technology and its
potential flaws.371 Collecting and analyzing data is well within the capacity of
government agencies that oversee community supervision. For example, in
2019, the Illinois General Assembly passed a bill that requires the state to collect
and publish data on how electronic monitoring is used, including the
demographics of who is placed on a monitor, the justifications for placing people
362. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1414–
15 (2010); David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 504 (2016).
363. See Horwitz, Coercion, supra note 155, at 80–81 (describing wide discretion afforded to courts
in imposing any probation condition).
364. See United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 468 (D.C. 2019) (detailing the process of a
detective asking the parole officer agency to have an individual electronically monitored).
365. See Doherty, supra note 39, at 344.
366. See Petersilia, supra note 73, at 153.
367. Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039,
1042 (2016).
368. Feeley supra note 89, at 1; Roth, Spit and Acquit, supra note 168, at 436.
369. See Homeland Security & Public Safety, SUPERCOM, http://www.supercom.com/hls
[https://perma.cc/XZM9-4YCF].
370. For a discussion of privatized policing technology, see Joh, Policing by Numbers, supra note 90,
at 66.
371. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 176–77.
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on monitors, and what happens to people once they are on monitors.372 This
legislation has the potential to serve as a model for other states committed to
better understanding how monitoring operates and if it leads to better
outcomes.
IV. SUSPICION-BASED SURVEILLANCE: A PATH FORWARD
By every indication, electronic surveillance is now a permanent fixture in
the criminal legal system. The more challenging question is how to limit and
regulate its imposition. In this final part, I suggest a path forward that not only
takes seriously public safety and the rehabilitative goals of supervision but also
moves away from the unfettered use of both consent and reasonableness to
justify otherwise unconstitutionally invasive conditions.
A.

Require a Warrant

The doctrinal solution for limiting electronic surveillance of those on
community supervision is straightforward: require a warrant.373 There are two
primary reasons this solution is doctrinally sound. First, electronic surveillance
of people on community supervision, at least as currently employed, is
conducted for law enforcement purposes and cannot be—nor should be—
construed as a “special needs” search. Unlike a physical search, where getting a
warrant may be impractical, it is less clear that obtaining a warrant to search a
cell phone or attach a GPS device to someone’s ankle is so impractical as to
excuse the warrant requirement.374
Furthermore, unlike the search at issue in Griffin, which was limited to a
physical search by a probation officer to monitor compliance with probation,
electronic surveillance is categorically different. The data obtained through
electronic surveillance is routinely relied on by probation, parole, and police
officers to make arrests for both new criminal offences and technical violations.
For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police extols GPS
monitoring because it can help place an “offender at the scene of a crime,
allowing an agency to identify potential suspects or witnesses” and “offender’s
alibi maybe supported or discredited using GPS data.”375 According to the
American Probation and Parole Association, “[m]any [probation and parole]
agencies have implemented manual or automated crime scene correlation
372. H.R. 386, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (enacted); see also Act of Aug. 9, 2019,
ch. 231 2019 Ill. Laws – (to be enacted at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 190/10).
373. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1299 (“[F]or most uses of
electronic surveillance, warrants supported by probable cause should be required.”)
374. Primus, supra note 208, at 310 (arguing that, in the context of special needs searches, courts
should ask whether complying with the warrant and probable cause requirements is actually
impractical).
375. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 48, at 4.
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systems that can identify tracked clients who were in the vicinity of a crime
scene.”376 Similarly, some of the electronic monitoring contracts that people sign
explain that police (not just probation and parole) officers may view and use the
data as evidence against them,377 and GPS data is often relied on in criminal
prosecutions.378 In these ways, electronic monitoring and surveillance of people
on community supervision “is ultimately indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control.”379
Unlike other special needs searches conducted by people who are clearly
not law enforcement (such as teachers or employers), there is little distinction
between probation officers and traditional police officers.380 On paper, parole
and probation officers may have different missions as compared to traditional law
enforcement officers, but in practice, their roles significantly overlap. Police
officers routinely conduct probation and parole searches and through these
searches discover evidence of new criminal offenses, technical violations, or
both.381 At the same time, parole and probation officers monitor supervisees’
compliance with probation and parole conditions, but in many states they also
have authority to arrest people for new criminal offenses as well as technical
violations.382 In short, it is hard, if not impossible, to make the case that
electronic surveillance is primarily imposed for non-law-enforcement purposes.
Ironically, this conclusion is consistent with at least part of the Court’s
reasoning in Knights and Samson: there was no dispute that the searches in those
cases were not justified on special needs grounds.
Second, if electronic surveillance is not categorized as a special needs
search, then it should follow that it is presumptively unconstitutional unless
376. AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, INCORPORATING LOCATION TRACKING SYSTEMS INTO
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 7 (2019), http://appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/stances/ip_IL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQ4Y-PRF3].
377. See COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PROB. DEP’T, CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO, ELECTRONIC
MONITORING/GPS TRACKING UNIT RULES (on file with author); KING CTY. WASH., DEP’T OF
ADULT & JUVENILE DET., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS-ELECTRONIC HOME
DETENTION (EHD) (on file with author); LCA ELEC. MONITORING PROGRAMS, SAN FRANCISCO
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT CLIENT ENROLLMENT PACKET (2019) (on file with author).
378. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 680 (Mass. 2019) (upholding as
reasonable police reliance on historical data from a GPS-equipped ankle monitor).
379. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
380. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) (noting that a probation officer is
considered a peace officer); see also Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir.
1986) (“A probation officer is clearly a law enforcement official as the term is ordinarily used. A
probation officer, either under the direction of the court or the Parole Commission, performs law
enforcement-related functions.”).
381. See Jacobi et al., supra note 220, at 940.
382. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-31(b) (Westlaw through Act 2019-540); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.2(a) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 948.06 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-626 (Lexis through
the 2019 Leg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.239 (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 178, of
the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th Leg.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 410.50 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2967.15 (Westlaw through 2019 portion of 2019–2020 Legis. Sess.).
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there is a warrant or an applicable exception.383 Requiring a warrant is not a
particularly high bar. It requires only probable cause that the defendant either
committed or is committing a new crime or violation of community supervision.
This approach more likely ensures that electronic surveillance is imposed
proportionally in a targeted and narrow way and not used as a bargaining
chip. A warrant requirement also more closely guards against wrongful coercion
and abuse and subjects the decision to appellate review.384
Requiring a warrant for electronic surveillance is hardly uncharted
territory. The Wiretap Act, for example, offers an instructive approach that
“requires the government to meet very high standards.”385 Under that law, a
court may issue an order authorizing electronic surveillance if it finds that: (1)
there is probable cause to believe that the individual is committing, has
committed, or will commit an enumerated offense; (2) that no other
investigative procedures are feasible; and (3) that the surveillance is conducted
in a way to minimize the interception of irrelevant information.386 This
approach is appealing not only because of the probable cause requirement but
also because of the demand for proportional surveillance.
A warrant requirement also appropriately places those on probation and
parole on similar footing as the arrested suspects in Riley and Carpenter. In
particular, law enforcement may still search a probationer’s cell phone or rely on
GPS monitoring, but they will need a warrant first. Given the availability of
electronic communications with on-call trial judges, the warrant requirement
does not pose an undue burden on law enforcement.387 As the Riley court
explained, “Recent technological advances . . . have . . . made the process of
obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.”388 Perhaps not surprisingly, since the
Riley decision, there has been an uptick in warrants for cell phone searches—
suggesting that obtaining a warrant is hardly a difficult hurtle to overcome.389
383. See Primus, supra note 208, at 311 (2011) (“Wholly suspicionless searches, like the one upheld
in Samson, should be impermissible.”); see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 128, at 351 (referring to
the Samson decision as “shameful”).
384. Of course, the probable cause standard is not immune from criticism, but entrepreneurial
scholars, such as Andrew Crespo, have proposed creative ways of fortifying the probable cause standard
with data. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
385. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, supra note 245, at 1282; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (2018).
386. See § 2518(3).
387. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154 (2013) (“Well over a majority of States allow
police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including
telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video
conferencing.”).
388. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
389. See Steve Roberts, Jr., Police Department Searches of Social Media, Cellphone Data Increasingly
Common, VA. GAZETTE (July 5, 2019), https://www.vagazette.com/news/va-vg-search-warrantsfacebook-0617-story.html [https://perma.cc/R47T-JR9M (dark archive)].
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Not only is obtaining a warrant increasingly straightforward, there may be other
relevant warrant exceptions that could provide a legal basis for a cell phone
search, such as exigency.
And even if expecting courts to require a warrant is unrealistic,390 at a
minimum, courts should require some level of suspicion (either reasonable
suspicion or probable cause) before subjecting someone to electronic
surveillance. This approach accounts for the unique status of people on
probation and parole and imposes minimal additional burdens on state actors.
Additionally, it offers an important limitation on unfettered reliance on
electronic surveillance.
Critics may argue that requiring a warrant or some level of suspicion
means that new crimes or probation violations will go undetected.391 That may
be true. But, as the Riley court noted, “privacy comes at a cost.”392 The
possibility of crimes going undetected is the price to not live in an Orwellian
and totalitarian society. Simply because the technological capacity to detect
lawbreakers with perfect omniscience and enforcement exists does not mean
that we should deploy it.393 It is true that if electronic search conditions were
limited, a probation officer would have a more difficult time detecting a
supervisee’s use of a certain word or picture on Facebook. But perhaps that
potential technical violation is itself more an artifact of the move toward
automated probation rather than a true indication of dangerous or otherwise
criminal activity.
Additionally, requiring a higher threshold to conduct electronic
surveillance does not alter the other traditional aspects of probation and parole.
Even if there were a warrant requirement for electronic surveillance, people on
community supervision would still be subject to physical searches, drug tests,
meetings with probation officers, as well as all the other requirements that were
in place—and relied on—before the advent of electronic surveillance
technology. Whether these other requirements raise separate constitutional
concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, but for now, those requirements
provide additional avenues by which probation and parole officers may still
monitor compliance.
Critics might also ask if the Fourth Amendment is even necessary if
electronic surveillance is imposed as a punishment. If surveillance is truly
390. As Cynthia Lee and others have pointed out, it is unlikely that the Court will “jettison[]
reasonableness as the cornerstone of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence anytime soon.” Lee, supra
note 214, at 1157.
391. See Woodrow Hartzog et al., Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1763, 1791 (“If perfect enforcement is possible, that is, an ex ante decision for zero tolerance for legal
violations, the temptation to embrace perfection is strong.”).
392. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401.
393. See Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795,
799 (2013).
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imposed as part of a criminal sentence—just like imposing jail time—why must
it pass Fourth Amendment muster? If other rights are diminished as part of a
criminal sentence (like the right to vote, serve on a jury, or bear arms) why, then,
can the government not limit privacy in the same way? The answer, at least
in part, is that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Bill of Rights limits
what can be imposed in the name of “punishment.” Just as “prison[ers] are not
beyond the reach of the Constitution”394 so too are those on community
supervision.395 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Samson, the Court has
never imposed “any search as a punitive measure.”396 The justification for
minimized privacy rights for those in prison, for example, is not punitive. In
prison, the Court has found “[t]he curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as
a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of ‘institutional needs and
objectives’ of prison facilities . . . chief among which is internal security.”397
Indeed, there is “nothing talismanic about labeling a search a ‘punishment’ that
automatically diminishes the privacy interests of the person being searched.”398
B.

Limit Surveillance

Requiring a warrant, or at least some level of suspicion, is a necessary but
insufficient solution to the problems inherent with electronic surveillance. The
other half of the solution involves two shifts in criminal policy. First, a shift
away from relying on community supervision as a default sentence; and second,
a shift away from relying on intensive surveillance as a necessary component of
community supervision.
Simply because probation and parole exist as nonincarcerative sentences,
this does not mean that they should be frequently imposed. In fact, less is often
the best strategy. As other scholars have observed, community supervision
results in net widening and is often imposed in cases when less intensive (or no)
supervision could serve as an alternative.399 Moreover, despite the growing
popularity of alternatives to incarceration, there is little empirical evidence that
intensive community supervision furthers rehabilitation, reentry, or protects
public safety.400

394. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).
395. In a forthcoming article, I use electronic surveillance as a case study to examine how criminal
punishment is deployed to justify limitations on otherwise constitutionally protected rights and
activities. See Kate Weisburd, Punishing Rights: The Constitutionality of Surveillance Sentences
(manuscript) (on file with author).
396. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 864 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
397. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 519, 556 (1974)).
398. McJunkin & Prescott, supra note 37, at 419.
399. See PHELPS, supra note 342, at 43; Klingele, supra note 317, at 1059;.
400. See JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 11; Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 423.
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Given the critiques of community supervision, it should not be utilized as
a presumptive sentence that is imposed instead of condition-free release.401 This
view is shared by a growing number of current and former probation chiefs who
recently released a joint statement calling for the reduction of probation and
parole populations.402 In a related policy report, several leading probation experts
called for reform focused on less intensive supervision and instead on reserving
community supervision for those that truly need it.403 This same report also
examined extensive data to disprove the notions that “more people have to be
under criminal justice control for crime to decline” and for “prison populations
to decrease.”404
Eliminating community supervision as a default sentence does not mean
that low-level defendants will receive no sanction. Even without probation and
parole, there remain responses to criminal conduct that further the deterrent,
rehabilitative, and retributive theories of punishment. The process of facing
criminal charges is in itself punitive.405 Pretrial detention, bail, administrative
fees, restitution, and fine payments, as well as the burdens of attending multiple
court dates, all add up to an ultimate de facto sanction. In many low-level or
first-time offenses, a conviction is punishment enough, given the extensive
collateral consequences of a criminal record. Even if not placed on probation or
parole, defendants continue to be punished when their criminal record becomes
a barrier to education, employment, and housing.406 In short, unconditional
release should be considered more often.407
For the reasons detailed in this Article, the use of electronic surveillance
as a tool of community supervision should be limited and proportional. While
there may be a place for electronic surveillance in community supervision, it
must be narrowly tailored to the specific needs of the individual and impose as
little of a privacy burden as possible. Imposing surveillance in this limited way,
however, requires greater understanding of how surveillance technology
operates, and in particular, how it may be more precisely targeted to avoid overly
invasive monitoring. It also requires “[s]trict oversight of private vendors” so as
to ensure that electronic surveillance “does not become a tool for financial
401. See Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing, supra note 79, at 771 (“[A]s many as 80% of adult
misdemeanor convictions result in sentences of probation.”).
402. JERRY ADGER, ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS 1 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/
programs/pcj/files/statement_on_the_future_of_community_corrections_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZF73-799R].
403. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 11; Scott-Hayward, supra note 86, at 460–61.
404. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 312, at 7.
405. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199 (1992).
406. See generally LOVE ET AL., supra note 287, at § 1:2 (describing the range of legal collateral
consequences).
407. See Klingele, supra note 317, at 1057.
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enrichment of the private sector at the expense of both government and lowincome individuals.”408
There is also much to be learned from community organizers who have
long been fighting back against the expansion of electronic surveillance in the
criminal legal system. These grassroots organizations have proposed commonsense guidelines for respecting the rights of people on electronic monitors.
These guidelines include increasing transparency, not using a one-size-fits-all
set of rules, eliminating fees, increasing privacy protections, and ensuring due
process.409 Perhaps most significantly, the guidelines also call for electronic
monitoring to be the option of last resort.410 Although these guidelines focus on
electronic monitoring, they could apply with equal force to any form of
electronic surveillance.
As this Article sets out, electronic searches and surveillance may have
reached a point in which the government “can replicate the surveillance
conditions of incarceration without ever erecting a single wall.”411 Therefore,
electronic surveillance should be viewed for what it is both as a matter of law and
as a matter of practice: punishment.412 To categorize electronic searches and
surveillance as a form of punishment is not only more accurate, but also signals
the need for closer judicial scrutiny, oversight, and restraint.413
CONCLUSION
Given the millions of people on some form of community supervision, the
increased capacity of surveillance technology represents “a revolution of historic
proportions.”414 It is therefore imperative that invasive, and potentially abusive,
forms of electronic surveillance be subject to constitutional scrutiny, policy
analysis, and public debate.
The significance of searches “untethered” from any meaningful
constitutional limitation extends beyond electronic surveillance. The
emergence of suspicionless electronic searches represents a cautionary tale about
the consequences of deploying “consent” and “reasonableness” to justify abusive
practices that would otherwise be unconstitutional, unconscionable, or both.
One could imagine a not-so-distant future when, as a matter of routine,

408. Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 173.
409. See generally LOVE ET AL., supra note 287, at § 1:2 (describing the range of legal collateral
consequences).
410. Id.
411. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1328 (2008).
412. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 128 (arguing that electronic GPS monitoring should be viewed
as punishment).
413. See Doherty, supra note 39, at 354.
414. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
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criminal defendants could be asked to “consent” to forced sterilization,415
lifetime GPS monitoring,416 forced participation in medical experiments,417 or
other draconian measures. Further, the general “reasonableness” test has already
been deployed by several lower courts to justify compulsory DNA profiling of
people on probation and parole.418 As Judge Reinhardt noted in his dissent in
one of the forced-DNA collection cases, “Privacy erodes first at the margins,
but once eliminated, its protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage
is rarely, if ever, undone.”419 While this Article focused on the abusive elements
of electronic surveillance, these concerns about abusive tactics are not limited to
electronic searches. More than ever, a new systematic and transparent approach
for determining which rights can be diminished, and for whom, is needed.

415. This is not unprecedented. Courts have, in the past, upheld plea-deals requiring sterilization.
See Rory Riley, Note, A Punishment That Does Not Fit the Crime: The Use of Judge-Ordered Sterilization as
a Condition of Probation, 20 QUINN. PROB. L.J. 72, 73 (2006); Sam P.K. Collins, Tennessee Prosecutor
Insisted Woman Undergo Sterilization as Part of Plea Deal, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://thinkprogress.org/tennessee-prosecutor-insisted-woman-undergo-sterilization-as-part-of-pleadeal-a1ad95a5e045/ [https://perma.cc/Y2JH-6K2E].
416. This practice is also not unprecedented. Although the Supreme Court in Grady determined that
lifetime GPS monitoring constitutes a search, lower courts are split on whether such a search is
reasonable. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016).
417. This country has a long history of experimentation on prisoners. See Keramet Reiter,
Experimentation on Prisoners: Persistent Dilemmas in Rights and Regulations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 501, 503
(2009).
418. See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that forced DNA
collection from probationers is not unreasonable); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 674 (6th Cir.
2006) (affirming the lower court’s holding requiring a DNA test from a bank fraud defendant); United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e conclude that under Fourth Amendment
reasonable standard for analyzing the constitutionality of government searches and seizures, the
collection of DNA samples from individuals on supervised release is constitutional.”); United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing for comprehensive DNA
profiling of a defendant on supervised release).
419. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 871 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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